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American takings jurisprudence provides much insight into in-
terpretations of the Takings Clause by United States Supreme
Court. These takings interpretations will be applied to takings
claims to decide whether business and land developers and owners
do not bear the public burdens or obligations of integrated devel-
opment and environmental sustainability policy and regulation.  Ec-
onomic, social, global and environmental forces create an
imminent need for the integration of traditional and future regula-
tory schemes, which provide development and environmental sus-
tainability for current and future generations.  Traditional and
future regulatory schemes are regulatory strands of an integrated
development and environmental sustainability policy and regula-
tion.  These regulatory strands include, among others, environmen-
tal quality, land use management, climate change, energy sources
and other matters.  Some strands impose old and new obligations
on exercises of private property rights but constitutional equity
must exist between public and private burdens borne by govern-
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ment and landowners, respectively.  However, public burdens can-
not be disproportionately borne by business, land developers and
landowners under the guarantee of the Takings Clause.  When land
developers and owners are forced to bear public burdens or obliga-
tions that should be borne by government, the guarantee of the
Takings Clause requires government to pay just compensation for a
taking of private property for public use.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Development and Environmental Sustainability . . 13
B. Property Rights under the Common Law and
Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C. Takings Clause and Public Burdens to Be Borne . 23
III. TAKINGS THEORIES UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE . . . . . . . 27
A. Regulatory Takings Analysis with Deference to
Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B. Regulatory Takings Tests with Less Deference for
Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
C. Physical Takings Analysis with a Duty to Pay for
Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. IMPACT OF TAKINGS CLAUSE ON STRANDS OF
INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Conditional Demands to Manage Social and
Ecological Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B. Land Use Management of Urban and Rural
Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
C. Preservation and Conservation of Natural
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
V. TAKINGS, PUBLIC USE, AND JUST COMPENSATION
CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. Takings Clause as a Limitation on Integrated
Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B. Public Use or Purpose as a Limitation on
Integrated Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
C. Just Compensation as a Limitation on Integrated
Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss1/1
2018] TAKINGS CLAUSE AND INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Business and land development rights are economic forces in
conflict with rapidly emerging social, production and environmen-
tal policy concerns, thus driving the need for an inclusive national
policy strategy and integrated national regulatory approach for sus-
tainable development and environment for current and future gen-
erations.1  Sustainable development and environmental interests
include interdependent and codependent economic, social, natu-
ral, global, and environmental forces.2  These interests can be fur-
thered by regulating land, industrial, business, and other
development to produce environmentally sensitive and efficient
land and business products.3  Regulated development and its sensi-
tivity and efficiency must further sustainable development and envi-
ronmental interests by establishing an integrated development and
environmental sustainability policy and regulatory framework.4  An
integrated sustainability regulation treats current and future regula-
tory schemes as interdependent or codependent regulatory strands
regulating environmental quality, natural resources, land use man-
agement, energy sources, social needs, and economic welfare.5  Na-
tional policy-making must respond to the need to integrate
interdependent and codependent economic productivity, social
1. See Meyer Robinson, The Standing Rock Sioux Claim Victory and Vindication in
Court, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/06/dakota-access-standing-rock-sioux-victory-court/530427/ (not-
ing “A federal judge rules that the Dakota Access pipeline did not receive an ade-
quate environmental vetting.”).  The Standing Rock Sioux pipeline and other
pipeline protests demonstrate a public policy concern that points to the need to
balance the exercise of private development rights and sustainable development
and environment interests. Id.
2. See Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Com-
mon Future, Ch. 1, ¶47, ¶47, THE WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV. (Mar. 30,
1987) (Gro Harlem Brundtland, Chairman, The World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development), http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf
(hereinafter Brundtland Report) (finding in Brundtland Report “[w]hat is re-
quired is a new approach in which all nations aim at a type of development that
integrates production with resource conservation and enhancement, and that links
both to the provision for all of an adequate livelihood base and equitable access to
resources.”).
3. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶47 (recognizing development
and environmental sustainability includes economic, social, and environmental
interests).
4. See id. (recognizing regulation of development must be efficient to adapt to
development restrictions and costs and sensitive to environmental, social, and
other needs of integrated sustainability policy).
5. See id. (recognizing integrated development and sustainability policy and
regulation must further both production and environmental policies).
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conditions, and environmental resources.6  Specifically, these inter-
dependent or codependent interests include land use manage-
ment, environmental quality, social welfare, business and industrial
growth, energy exploration, and real estate development.7  Na-
tional policy-making for integrated sustainability has shown little
deference to, if not summarily dismissed, need for integrated policy
and regulation. Further it has relegated this policy to traditional
regulatory treatment by some state and federal policy-makers as
land use or environmental regulation.8
Little deference by politicians and reliance on traditional regu-
lation will continue to delay the entry of the federal judiciary in
deciding whether an integrated development and environmental
sustainability policy and regulation are constitutionally valid.9  The
federal judiciary cannot address the constitutional validity of the
new burdens that will be added to the current burdens borne by
landowners and government.  These owners already comply with a
6. Id. (recognizing integrated sustainability approach includes decision-mak-
ing or policy-making to broadly connect economic, social, and environmental
forces).
7. Id. (recognizing integrated sustainability approach includes decision-mak-
ing or policy-making to connect legislative and regulatory fields, such as land envi-
ronment, natural resources, land use management, and social needs).
8. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html (“President Trump announced on Thursday
that the United States would withdraw from the Paris climate accord, weakening
efforts to combat global warming and embracing isolationist voices in his White
House who argued that the agreement was a pernicious threat to the economy and
American sovereignty.”).
9. See James R. May, Not at All: Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court,
10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 20, 21 (2009) (finding Court has not addressed
sustainability but has addressed environmental, land use and other issues further-
ing development and environmental sustainability). Professor May reviewed envi-
ronmental cases and concluded that “unless and until parties amass the courage of
their conviction and infuse ‘sustainability’ into litigative lexicon and strategy, sus-
tainability will continue to matter to the U.S. Supreme Court not at all.” Id. at 21.
Development and environmental sustainability issues may be raised as climate
change, growth management, or other activities.  These issues may eventually re-
quire the federal judiciary to decide whether government is permitting business
development, industrial growth and land uses to threaten the survival of current
and future generations. See Juliana v. U.S., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1240 (D. Or.
2016), motions adopted and denied, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 89000 (D. Or. 2017).  In
Juliana, several plaintiffs brought an action against the U.S. government alleging
that the government had prior knowledge of the harm to atmosphere caused by
CO-2 omissions. Id. at 1234.  The district court also concluded that several plain-
tiffs who were children and youth had standing to join the litigation against the
U.S. government, but decided to wait until summary judgment to decide to make a
final decision. Id. at 1244.  However, the district court recognized that the consti-
tutional claim was substantive due process with caution and restraint in finding
that the government had knowingly furthered climate change and failed to act to
stop it. Id. at 1252.
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traditional, well-established patchwork of independent regulatory
schemes addressing past local, state, and national problems, such as
water pollution, toxic land, and growth management.10  If federal,
state, and local policy-makers do not respond to sustainable devel-
opment and environmental needs, federal and state policy-makers
will not be able to respond under current regulatory schemes.  Cur-
rent land use management and other policies or lack thereof were
not designed to address interrelated economic, environmental and
social harm caused by land development, energy production, cli-
mate change, and other activities.
Integrated development and environmental sustainability regu-
lation that adds more development and environmental obligations
will include bans, restrictions, conditional demands, and other
mandates on current and new exercises of constitutionally pro-
tected private property rights.  Objectively, business, land develop-
ers, and landowners are entitled to constitutional equity and are
only obligated to bear equitable burdens that are proportional to
the harmful impact of their land and business developments on
land use management, natural resources, environmental quality, so-
cial growth, and other conditions and needs.11  Later, these obliga-
tions may be increased by integrated development and
10. See Sustainability and the U.S. EPA, 25 COMM. ON INCORPORATING SUS-
TAINABILITY IN THE U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/
13152/chapter/1 (last visited July 18, 2017) (hereinafter Committee on Incorpo-
rating Sustainability) (finding “[m]any of the key principles and concepts in sus-
tainable development are rooted in, or similar to, concepts in U.S. conservation
and environmental law . . . .  [T]he United States has not used a national strategy
or sustainability ‘indicators’ . . . .”). Id. at 25; see U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED), AGENDA 21, ch. 8.14 (1992), https://sustain-
abledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (last visited July 28,
2017), (hereinafter AGENDA 21) (stating “[t]o effectively integrate environment
and development in the policies and practices of each country, it is essential to
develop and implement integrated, enforceable and effective laws and regulations
that are based upon sound social, ecological, economic and scientific principles.”)
Id.
11. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”). Id.
In a footnote in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the Court referred to future uses that could be considered by government
in making regulation that was challenged as a regulatory taking by stating that “[i]t
is, of course, irrelevant that appellees interfered with or destroyed property rights
that Penn Central had not yet physically used.  The Fifth Amendment must be
applied with reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard
to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably
expected in the immediate future.”  Id. at 109 n.6 (citing Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U.S. 403, 408 (1879) (emphasis added)).
5
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environmental sustainability regulations. These regulations add
more obligations to save environmental, natural, social, and other
resources and provide environmental and natural qualities, human
growth, and social benefits to untold future generations.12  We treat
constitutional equity as fairness and justice of the Takings Clause
guarantee13 to protect landowners against disproportionate regula-
tory burdens or unfairly sharing public burdens.14  Thus, constitu-
tional equity must be in the design of integrated development and
environmental sustainability policy and regulation by weighing co-
independent and interdependent regulatory strands. This will en-
sure numerous obligations that further environmental, social, and
productivity needs do not unknowingly impose public burdens on
land and business developers and owners.
Integrated development and environment sustainability regula-
tion can be expected to impose restrictive mandates, make substan-
tial conditional demands, and provide meaningful offsetting
benefits.  These integrated mandates and demands increase private
and public burdens and eventually alter the current proportionality
of these burdens borne by government and landowners.  Federal
constitutional issues regarding the validity of changes to the current
proportionality best fit the limitation of the Takings Clause.15  This
proportionality was established by the Court’s application of the
Takings Clause to permanent and temporary bans, uses restrictions,
conditional demands and offsetting benefits that were imposed by
federal, state, and local governments as they accepted their public
burdens or obligations with and without payment of just compensa-
12. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (concluding government cannot impose pub-
lic’s burdens on landowners); see Committee on Incorporating Sustainability, supra
note 10, at 41 & 41 n.1 (explaining each generation has obligations to future gen-
eration and should preserve quality of and preserve access to environment).
13. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (concluding government cannot mandate
landowners to bear public burdens); see Committee on Incorporating Sus-
tainability, supra note 10, at 41 & 41 n.1 (finding need for intergenerational and
intragenerational in development and environmental sustainability).
14. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (guaranteeing fairness and justice by prohib-
iting disproportionate burden on landowners); see Committee on Incorporating
Sustainability, supra note 10, at 41 & 41 n.1 (recognizing need for current genera-
tional equity in implementing sustainable development and environment).
15. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, CL. 4. (requiring government to pay just compensa-
tion for taking private property for public use).  The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to the federal government.
Id.  The United States Supreme Court has made the Takings Clause applicable to
the States by incorporating the Takings Clause in the Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment.  Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
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tion.16  Any new proportionality must not make regulatory burdens
too great for land and business developers and owners to bear.  Still
the proportionality must include regulatory burdens or obligations
to address harm caused by land and business development and
other activities that include construction, energy, industries, institu-
tions, and commerce.17  Federal and state policy-makers eventually
must decide to design and implement an integrated development18
16. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (showing
public burden imposed on landowner by the Kohler Act, anti-subsidence legisla-
tion, and need to pay just compensation); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (detailing no public burden imposed on landowners
under historical preservation regulation and no just compensation);  Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (describing public burden
imposed on landowner by coastal zone management regulation and just compen-
sation must be paid); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372 (1994) (stating public
burden imposed on landowners by land dedication conditions and just compensa-
tion must be paid); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S.
Ct. 2586 (2013) (showing public burden imposed on landowner by monetary exac-
tions and just compensation must be paid).
17. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Con-
struction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use
Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 731, 733 (2008) (hereinafter Circo-Green
Building) (citing Charles J. Kibert, Green Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 491, 493-94 (2004); Pekka Huovila et al., Buildings and Cli-
mate Change: Status, Challenges and Opportunities, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (2007);
Mara Baum, Green Building Research Funding: An Assessment of Current Activity in the
United States, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL (2007) (footnotes omitted) (providing
report prepared for  U.S. Green Building Council Research Committee), https://
www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/Green-Building-Research-Funding.pdf; Ste-
phen T. Del Percio, Comment, The Skyscraper, Green Design, & The LEED Green
Building Rating System: The Creation of Uniform Sustainable Standards for the 21st Cen-
tury or the Perpetuation of an Architectural Fiction?, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J.
117, 125-26 (2004) (arguing for private and public sectors to support green build-
ing and adoption of green construction and design practices).
18. See Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶30 (stating that “sustaina-
ble development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in
which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation
of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with
future as well as present needs.”).  An enormous sustainability policy concern is
caused the impact of harmful but productive land and business development
projects and practices on communities and their environmental, natural resources,
land use management, and social resources and by new construction generating a
tremendous amount of waste. See Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-
Performance Buildings Pay Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive
Programs and Other Sustainable Development Initiatives?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 55, 55-57 (2009) (hereinafter Circo-Impact Fees) (citing Mara Baum,
Green Building Research Funding: An Assessment of Current Activity in the United States 7,
U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL (2007), https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/
Green-Building-Research-Funding.pdf) (recognizing development sustainability
includes design of buildings and costs and investments in making building
greens).
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and environmental19 sustainability policy and regulation.20  The
newly enacted  integrated sustainability regulation may have little
effect on proportionality of public and private burdens under cur-
rent regulatory schemes.  These current public and private burdens
of environmental, natural resources, social, and other regulatory
schemes21 should not change and remain public and private bur-
dens of the regulatory strands22 of the newly enacted integrated de-
velopment and sustainability policy and regulation.  Initially,
business and land developers and owners will face only a change in
the form of regulation that is an integrated sustainability regulation
with current substantive obligations.  This initial integrated sus-
19. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶40 (stating that
“[e]nvironment and development are not separate challenges; they are inexorably
linked.  Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental resource
base; the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out of account the
costs of environmental destruction.  These problems cannot be treated separately
by fragmented institutions and policies.”).
20. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶48 (recognizing that “[t]he
concept of sustainable development provides a framework for the integration of
environment policies and development strategies . . . .  But the integration of envi-
ronment and development is required in all countries, rich and poor.”). Report of
the Capacity Building Workshop and Expert Group Meeting on Integrated Approaches to
Sustainable Development Planning and Implementation 5, UNITED NATIONS, DEP’T OF
ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 3, 2015), https://sus
tainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/8506IASD%20Workshop%20
Report%2020150703.pdf (hereinafter UN DESA Report) (exploring opportunities
and actions to advance integrated development sustainability).  In 2015, the UN
DESA Report finds that:
Integrated planning for, and implementation of, national sustainable de-
velopment strategies has remained challenging. Member States noted this
challenge by recognizing in the Rio+20 Outcome Document the inade-
quacy of sector-based strategies by calling for “holistic and integrated ap-
proaches to sustainable development” (paragraph 40) and the “need for
more coherent and integrated planning and decision-making at the na-
tional . . . level” (paragraph 101).
Id. at 5 (citing ¶ 40, “The Future We Want,” Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
on 27 July 2012, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 11, 2012)).
21. See AGENDA 21, supra note 10, ch. 8.13 (finding national law or legisla-
tion is piecemeal and lacks enforcement to further development and environmen-
tal sustainability policies). As early as 1992, AGENDA 21 found grounds to revise
legal or regulatory framework to further development and environmental sus-
tainability policy-making, though much regulation and law was being made to pro-
tect the environment and natural resources. Id.  AGENDA 21 recognized that
each county is unique with special conditions and needs and found that “although
the volume of legal texts in this field is steadily increasing, much of the law-making
in many countries seems to be ad hoc and piecemeal, or has not been endowed
with the necessary institutional machinery and authority for enforcement and
timely adjustment.” Id.
22. See also AGENDA 21, supra note 10, ch. 8.13 (using Agenda 21 findings to
treat national and state regulatory or legislative fields as interdependent or
codependent regulatory strands of a single body of integrated sustainability policy
and regulation rather than as single independent regulatory schemes). Id.
8
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tainability regulation will be short-lived as natural events and man-
made development threaten to impose greater harm on
environmental, social and economic resources.
The public burdens of an integrated sustainability regulation
will increase as federal, state and local governments impose man-
dates, request conditional demands and provide offsetting benefit
to land and business developers and owners and business organiza-
tions.  Such owners must bear an equitable portion of the burdens
caused by manmade and natural harm and harmful effects on
degradable and nonrenewable land, natural, social, and environ-
mental resources.  The United States Supreme Court has con-
cluded that takings claims challenge the  proportionality of the
burdens borne by government and landowners.23  These claims
challenging proportionality arose under federal and state environ-
mental and natural resources regulation and state and municipal
land use and growth management regulation to provide distinct
public needs.24  These regulatory schemes or regulation had not
been coordinated or made comprehensive enough to fully inte-
grate economic, social, global, and environmental needs of sustain-
able development and environment for current and future
generations.25  The Court has yet to review a takings challenge to
23. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (concluding personal and real property own-
ers should not bear public burdens that should be borne solely by government
through paying just compensation).
24. See e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (detailing
anti-subsidence legislation); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978) (explaining origin of historical preservation regulation); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (discussing land use controls); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (explaining coastal zone manage-
ment regulation); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (discussing land
dedication conditions); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133
S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (detailing adjudicated monetary exactions of land use regula-
tory scheme); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (examining merger provi-
sion of land use regulatory scheme).
25. See Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶47 (finding current regula-
tory schemes, such land use and environmental protection, may not be effective
and need for integrative approach to design and implement sustainable develop-
ment and environmental policy); AGENDA 21, supra note 10, at ch. 8.1.a & 8.1.c.
Chapter 8 of Agenda 21 explains integration of environmental and development
decision-making or policy-making and identifies several program areas that in-
cluded “[i]ntegrating environment and development at the policy, planning and
management levels . . . [and] [p]roviding an effective legal and regulatory frame-
work.” Id.
As early as 1992, AGENDA 21 found that “[p]revailing systems for decision-
making in many countries tend to separate economic, social and environmental
factors at the policy, planning and management levels.  This influences the actions
of all groups in society, including Governments, industry and individuals, and has
important implications for the efficiency and sustainability of development.” Id. at
ch. 8.2.  AGENDA 21 also concluded that the “adjustment or even a fundamental
9
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integrated development and environmental sustainability policy
and regulation that fully integrated the inter-dependent or
codependent patchwork of land use, environmental, social, energy
and other regulation.26  Generally, this lack of review by the Court
should be short-lived as state and local governments rather than the
federal government recognize the need to enact and enforce inte-
grated sustainability policy and regulation to protect their natural
resources, business and industrial productivity and citizens.
As states and their counties and municipalities suffer more
harm to or harmful effects on environmental, natural, economic,
social, and other resources, a few states will eventually need to re-
spond by rethinking their patchwork of regulatory schemes. These
states must strongly consider an integrated policy and regulatory
approach that by design reflects constitutional equity to develop-
ment and environmental sustainability policy goals, objectives, and
regulation.27  Some states may need to allow county and municipal
governments to take a greater role in sustainable development and
environment and develop a regulatory approach to integrated sus-
tainability policy-making.28  At the state or local governmental
levels, federal and state policy-making for integrated sustainability
policy and regulation must retain much old, consistent land use,
environmental quality, and other regulatory goals and objectives.
This policy-making must also add new and different development
reshaping of decision-making, in the light of country-specific conditions, may be
necessary if environment and development is to be put at the centre of economic
and political decision-making, in effect achieving a full integration of these fac-
tors.” Id.
26. May, supra note 9, at 21 (finding development and environmental sus-
tainability are not issues before United States Supreme Court); see also AGENDA
21, supra note 10, ch. 8.13 (recognizing much “law-making in many countries . . .
has not been endowed with the necessary institutional machinery and authority for
enforcement and timely adjustment.” AGENDA 21, supra note 10, ch. 8.13).
27. See, Embedding the Environment in Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NA-
TION ENV’T PROGRAMME, UNEP Post-2015 Discussion Paper 1, Version 2 (July 19,
2013) (hereinafter UNEP), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/doc
uments/2037embedding-environments-in-SDGs-v2.pdf (detailing how United Na-
tions Environmental Programme (UNEP) sets forth “a framework [that] is sug-
gested for embedding environmental sustainability into [Sustainable
Developments Goals] (SDGs)) Id. at 2.  UNEP established “an integrated ap-
proach for embedding the environment in goals and targets . . . .” Id.
28. AGENDA 21, supra note 10, ch. 28.1 (recognizing need to involve more
than federal and state governments in integrating policy, planning and manage-
ment of implementing sustainable development and environment). Id.; see Robert
R. M. Verchick, Can Local Government Save the Global Commons? Lessons from the Jo-
hannesburg Summit, 4 STAN. AGORA 4, 2 (2003) (“examin[ing] how the efforts of
local government can best be marshaled to achieve sustainable development on
the local and the international levels - to “save,” in the words of the title, “the
global commons”). Id. at 3.
10
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and environmental sustainability goals and objectives, such as regu-
lating disposal construction and development waste materials.29
Past takings challenges lead us to conclude that the impact of
codependent and interdependent regulatory strands on the exer-
cise of property rights will eventually lead some land and business
developers and owners to challenge new development bans, costly
construction practices, and other mandates as unconstitutional tak-
ings of private property for public use without the payment of just
compensation.30  Thus, federal and state governments can avoid
some of these challenges by designing integrated development and
environmental sustainability policy and legislation. The integrated
development and environmental sustainability policy and legisla-
tion will recognize, weigh and equitably address the burdens im-
posed on landowners and the public in responding to the harm or
harmful effects of climate change, energy production and con-
sumption, social welfare needs, and environment resources.
Business and land developers and owners can depend on the
Takings Clause to ensure government does not disproportionately
impose unjustified obligations or burdens on them to further inte-
grated sustainability policy goals and objectives for current and fu-
ture generations.  This article consists of an introduction and five
other parts.  Part I is the Introduction immediately above and sets
forth an argument for integrated development and environmental
sustainability policy and regulation that must survive constitutional
muster under the Takings Clause based on the proportionality of
the burdens borne by the public and landowners.  Part II discusses
29. See Circo-Green Building, supra note 17, at 733 (citing Mara Baum, Green
Building Research Funding: An Assessment of Current Activity in the United States, U.S.
GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL 1 (2007) (footnotes omitted) (a report prepared for
U.S. Green Building Council Research Committee), https://www.usgbc.org/sites/
default/files/Green-Building-Research-Funding.pdf (recognizing environmental
harm caused by development and construction industries and its impact on sus-
tainable development and environment); see Committee on Incorporating Sus-
tainability, supra note 10, at 25.  “U.S. conservation and environmental law has
advanced sustainability in some areas. Nonetheless, the United States has not used
a national strategy or sustainability ‘indicators.’” Id. Moreover, “U.S. environmen-
tal and conservation laws . . . includ[e] protection of human health, preservation
for aesthetics or recreation, biocentrism, sustainability of the resource base, envi-
ronmental justice, efficiency, pursuit of scientific knowledge and technology, in-
tergenerational equity, and community stability. Id. (citing Campbell-Mohn, C.,
Sustainable Environmental Law: Integrating Natural Resource and Pollution Abatement
Law from Resources to Recovery, ST. PAUL, MN: WEST PUBL’G CO. (1993)).
30. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing various constitu-
tional claims that landowners and developers can bring under Takings, Public Use
and Just Compensation Clauses of Fifth Amendment for exercises of eminent do-
main, police and other powers to take ownership of or acquire benefits for public
use from an interest in real or personal property).
11
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the interrelated natures, ongoing conflict, and public-private con-
nection among the Takings Clause, private property rights, and sus-
tainable development and environment.  Part III explains federal
takings theories applied by the Court to limit government policy
and regulation of land use and other regulation to protect the envi-
ronmental quality and natural resources and control land use and
growth management.  Part IV explains how the Takings Clause
could limit or prohibit land use, environmental, and other regula-
tion that could eventually be regulatory strands mandating obliga-
tions under an integrated approach to sustainable development
and environment to restrict exercises of private property rights.
Part V explains the scope and nature of the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee consisting of three constitutional provisions to make cer-
tain that public burdens are not borne by landowners under gov-
ernment regulatory schemes.  In the conclusion or Part VI, we
argue integrated development and environmental sustainability
policy and regulation must eventually be enacted by federal, state
and local governments.  This integrated sustainability policy and
regulation are needed to further development and environmental
sustainability objectives and goals and impose obligations and bene-
fits on exercises of private property and business development in-
terests.  Thus, government policy-makers must ascertain and weigh
obligations or burdens imposed on land and business developers
and owners by regulatory restrictions, demands, and offsetting ben-
efits to design and implement integrated development and environ-
mental sustainability policy and regulation in accordance with the
guarantee and principles of the Takings Clause.
II. CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT
AND ENVIRONMENT
The Takings Clause, private property rights, and sustainable
development and environmental interests are interrelated by the
proportionality of the burdens borne by government and landown-
ers. This proportionality affects the design of integrated develop-
ment and environmental sustainability policy and regulation to
address harm and harmful effects of natural events and manmade
activities on American land, population and society.  Federal inte-
grated sustainability policy and regulation must further sustainable
development and environment goals and objectives to protect spe-
cific economic, social, and environmental interests.  In furtherance
of proportional burdens, integrated sustainability regulation must
be valid under the Takings Clause that addresses burdens or obliga-
12
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tions borne by the public and landowners to implement sustainable
development and environment.  Thus, the Court must eventually
determine the constitutional protection provided by the Takings
Clause to protect private property rights and advance sustainable
development and environmental interests under integrated devel-
opment and environmental sustainability policy and regulation
schemes.
A. Development and Environmental Sustainability
Sustainable development and environment is more than natu-
ral and manmade harm to natural resources, social welfare and en-
vironmental quality and must include the production of essential
products and services needed by humans, communities, and future
generations.  Globally, in 1972, the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (Stockholm Convention) recognized that
“humans [can] ‘do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly en-
vironment on which our life and well-being depend’”31 and pro-
duced the “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (commonly called the Stockholm Declara-
tion) . . . .”32  The Stockholm Declaration “intended to respond to
concerns about ‘dangerous levels of pollution in water, air, earth
and living beings; major and undesirable disturbances to the eco-
logical balance of the biosphere; destruction and depletion of irre-
placeable resources.’”33  The Stockholm Convention did not
mention sustainable development and environment; it “laid the
foundation for integrated consideration of environment and devel-
opment issues.”34  In 1987, the Brundtland Report was issued by
The World Commission on Environment and Development (World
Commission) that met “to re-examine the critical environment and
development issues and to formulate realistic proposals for dealing
31. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability: Can Law Meet The Challenge?, 34 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 283, 284 (2011) (recognizing harm done to environment
by humans).
32. Id. at 285 (recognizing efforts by United Nations to address harm to envi-
ronment by humans).
33. Id. (stating purpose of Stockholm Convention).
34. Id. (finding Stockholm Convention introduced need to integrate develop-
ment and environmental sustainability).  An enormous sustainability policy con-
cern is raised by harmful but productive land and business development projects
and practices on communities and their environmental, natural, land and social
resources. See Circo-Impact Fees, supra note 18, at 56-57 (citing Mara Baum, Green
Building Research Funding: An Assessment of Current Activity in the United States 7, U.S.
GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL (2007), https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/
Green-Building-Research-Funding.pdf).
13
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with them . . . .”35  The World Commission was also mandated to
establish proposals “to propose new forms of international coopera-
tion on these issues . . . and to raise the levels of understanding and
commitment to action . . . .”36  Other commissions and programs
have been established and implemented by the United Nations to
study and report on sustainable development and environment.37
Each country must establish policy objectives and regulatory mecha-
nisms to further sustainable environment and development result-
ing from the catastrophic impact of the “current ecological
footprint . . . [of] 1.5 planets - half a planet more than earth.”38
Thus, the Stockholm Declaration and Brundtland Report are the
grounds and support for the integration of development and envi-
ronmental sustainability policy and regulation among economic, so-
cial, and environmental needs.  These needs encompass the
environment and its impact on public welfare and its effects on the
exercise of private property rights.
America’s sustainable development and environment concerns
may be confounded or divided by distinct government policies pro-
tecting land use, natural resources, and environmental quality.
These policies impose restrictive obligations, conditional demands,
temporary or permanent moratoria on development, and grant so-
cial and other program benefits to the public and landowners.
These distinct policies do not focus public consciousness on the
35. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 12 (stating one of fundamental objec-
tives of World Commission to address global concerns regarding environmental
sustainability, poverty and inequality). The impact of land and business develop-
ment will require extremely diligent policy efforts to mandate and urge land and
business developers to work harmoniously with government policy-makers on the
best solutions to reduce harm on land natural, environmental and social resources.
See Circo-Green Building, supra note 17, at 733 (citing Charles J. Kibert, Green
Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 491, 493-94 (2004);
Pekka Huovila et al., Buildings and Climate Change: Status, Challenges and Opportuni-
ties, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (2007); Mara Baum, Green Building Research Funding:
An Assessment of Current Activity in the United States 1, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL
(2007) (footnotes omitted) (report prepared for U.S. Green Building Council Re-
search Committee), https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/Green-Building-
Research-Funding.pdf; Stephen T. Del Percio, Comment, The Skyscraper, Green De-
sign, & The LEED Green Building Rating System: The Creation of Uniform Sustainable
Standards for the 21st Century or the Perpetuation of an Architectural Fiction?, 28 ENVI-
RONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 117, 125-26).
36. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 12.
37. See Main Milestones, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=972
&menu=35 (last visited July 18, 2017) (listing World Commission on Environment
and Development (1987), United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment: Agenda 21 (1992), Commission on Sustainable Development (1993),
Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS (1994), etc.).
38. Bratspies, supra note 29, at 284-85.
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American development and environmental sustainability39 needs
created by the success of economic, technological and social
growth.40  American policy-makers must accept and build on the
fact that “the ‘environment’ is where we all live; and ‘development’
is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that
abode.  The two are inseparable . . . .”41  The United States is no
39. Committee on Integrating Sustainability, supra note 10, at 15 (recognizing
United States depends on environmental, natural resources and land use policies
and regulation to protect environment and restrict development).  The Commit-
tee on Incorporating Sustainability gives the grounds for development and envi-
ronmental sustainability by stating that:
Sustainability is based on a simple and long-recognized factual premise:
Everything that humans require for their survival and well-being depends,
directly or indirectly, on the natural environment (Marsh 1864). The en-
vironment provides the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the food
we eat. It defines in fundamental ways the communities in which we live
and is the source for renewable and nonrenewable resources on which
civilization depends. Our health and well-being, our economy, and our
security all require a high quality environment.
Id. (citing G. P. Marsh, Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human
Action, CAMBRIDGE, MA.: BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIV. PRESS (1864)).
Much inconsistency exists in defining sustainability under international and
domestic law.  Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sus-
tainable Development, Business, and Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 317, 417, 425
(2015). “[T]he [sustainability] movement extends sustainability to include social
concerns over how environmentally sensitive development can be managed to en-
hance global equity and equality of material well-being. Sustainability also incorpo-
rates political and cultural concerns in economic development[.]” Id. at 417
(citing Our Creative Diversity 48, WORLD COMM’N ON CULTURE AND DEV. (1996),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105586e.pdf).  Furthermore,
development and environmental sustainability has critics on legal, political, institu-
tional and other concerns. See Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, What
Has Changed in Forty Years And What Needs to Change as a Result: Replacing Sus-
tainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. 841, 853-857 (2013) (Symposium: The Next Genera-
tion of Environmental And Natural Resources Law).
40. Committee on Incorporating Sustainability, supra note 10, at 25 (recogniz-
ing conservation and environmental further many development and environmen-
tal sustainability goals and objectives).  “Many of the key principles and concepts in
sustainable development are rooted in, or similar to, concepts in U.S. conservation
and environmental law. Generally, U.S. conservation and environmental law has
advanced sustainability in some areas.” Id.
Development and environmental sustainability policy and regulation must be
designed to impose mandates and conditional demands that require or urge land
developers and owners to adopt or comply with new construction and other prac-
tices. See Circo-Impact Fees, supra note 18, at 60-61 (finding federal, municipal,
and state governments support building green programs, proposing use of impact
fees or exactions to finance the cost of constructing green buildings, and explor-
ing constitutional limitations on state efforts to support green buildings).
41. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 13 (giving Chairman’s Forward).  Pro-
fessor Circo states that “the environmental costs extend well beyond energy for
building operations.”  As one recent report explains:
Building operation accounts for 40% of U.S. energy use; this number in-
creases to an estimated 48% when the energy required to make building
materials and construct buildings are included. Building operations
alone contribute over 38% of the U.S.’s carbon dioxide emissions and
15
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exception.42  We must begin to rethink our national and state
patchwork of natural resources, environmental, social welfare, and
land use management policies and regulation to create an inte-
grated approach to development and environmental sustainability
policy and regulation for current and future generations.43  This
integrated approach that adjusts burdens and benefits of American
society will trigger the need to consider fairness and justice in pro-
portioning the burdens imposed by integrated sustainability policy
and regulation. An integrated approach may include mandating
green buildings, forcefully responding to coastal degradation, and
addressing other natural and manmade harm or harmful effects.44
over 12% of its water consumption. Waste from demolition, construction
and remodeling makes up over 35% of all non-industrial waste (1996).
Circo-Green Building, supra note 17, at 733 (quoting Mara Baum, Green Building
Research Funding: An Assessment of Current Activity in the United States 1, THE GREEN
BUILDING COUNCIL (2007) (footnotes omitted) (report prepared for U.S. Green
Building Council Research Committee), https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/
files/Green-Building-Research-Funding.pdf).
42. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶52 (explaining “[n]o country
can develop in isolation from others. Hence the pursuit of sustainable develop-
ment requires a new orientation in international relations. Long term sustainable
growth will requi[r]e [sic] far-reaching changes to produce trade, capital, and
technology flows that are more equitable and better synchronized to environmen-
tal imperatives”).
43. Committee on Incorporating Sustainability, supra note 10, at 25 (recogniz-
ing United States is taking different approach by currently using environmental
and conservation policies to achieve development and environmental sus-
tainability).  The United States has not fully developed a national strategy for sus-
tainability or established sustainability indicators to implement and enforce
sustainability. Id. After 2008, the United States began to recognize the importance
of green industry that included jobs and green businesses as a part of sustainable
development and environment. See id.
In June 2009, the United States and other members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted a Declaration on
Green Growth that identified a number of policy instruments to encourage green
investment to enable long-term sustainable development and environment. Id. at
27 (citing Declaration on Green Growth, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (June 25, 2009)).
44. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶51 (explaining “[n]o single
blueprint of sustainability will be found, as economic and social systems and eco-
logical conditions differ widely among countries.  Each nation will have to work
out its own concrete policy implications.  Yet irrespective of these differences, sus-
tainable development should be seen as a global objective.”).
Greening policy and regulation are regulatory means to begin and initiate
development and environmental sustainability by regulating or controlling the
construction of building and other space. See, e.g., Michael Burger, It’s Not Easy
Being Green: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 839 (2010) (examining whether “municipalities attempts to
brand themselves ‘green’ to increase their competitiveness in the interlocal market
for residents, businesses, and capital warrant a revised application of the [market-
place participant exception] (MPE) to federal ceiling preemption.”). Id.; Circo-
Impact Fees, supra note 18, at 61 (examining policy concerns and legal issues, con-
stitutional and land use law, and making policy recommendations on state and
16
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Furthermore, looking beyond its boundaries, federal policy-makers
must recognize that “the development decisions of these. . . [devel-
oped] countries, because of their great economic and political
power, will have a profound effect upon the ability of all peoples to
sustain human progress for generations to come.”45  The Federal
Constitution and its limitations and rights must be carefully
weighed in designing and implementing an integrated develop-
ment and environmental sustainability policy and regulation.
As government recognizes and accepts greater public burdens
under an integrated sustainability policy and regulation, the private
burdens will not remain the same or be absorbed entirely by the
public and government to make markets work or allow business or-
ganizations to increase wealth.  Beyond the public burdens, the pri-
vate burdens or regulatory obligations of business and land
developers and business organizations that must reduce harm and
harmful effects on society and its natural, social and environmental
resources will increase to address environmental and development
sustainability concerns.46  Federal, state, and local governments
must eventually design and implement an integrated development
and environment sustainability policy and regulation47 by exercis-
local green building programs at state and local government levels, highlighting
most significant policy and legal regulations and incentives); Circo-Green Build-
ings, supra note 17, at 732-33 (“argu[ing] that timely, meaningful progress toward
sustainability in the U.S. building industry requires state-level legislation that pro-
motes, and sometimes even mandates, green building standards at the regional
and local levels.”). Id.
45. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 13 (Chairman’s Forward) (recogniz-
ing effects of development and environmental sustainability decisions of devel-
oped countries on other nations).  Commentators believe that sustainability starts
with county and municipal governments. See Jerrold A. Long, Sustainability Starts
Locally: Untying the Hands of Local Governments to Create Sustainable Communities, 10
WYO. L. REV. 1 (2010) (“argu[ing] that over the coming century, creating and
maintaining sustainable western communities will require a changed focus onto
the West’s private lands [and giving] . . . the legal impediments that might exist to
creating sustainable western communities, with suggestions for how to overcome
those impediments”). Id. at 4.
46. See Long, supra note 45, at 1 (recognizing impediments to creating and
maintaining development and environmental sustainability in western
communities).
47. See Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶47 (concluding integrative
approach to designing and implementing sustainable development and environ-
mental policy is needed).  In the 1990s, the coordination of federal farmland poli-
cies required the cross compliance of farmland preservation (land use), farm
management (production), environmental (wetland), and natural resources (soil
and water conservation) policies. See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Rethink-
ing Local and State Agricultural Land Use and Natural Resource Policies: Coordinating
Programs to Address the Interdependency and Combined Losses of Farms, Soils, And Farm-
land, 5 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 379, 378-445 (1990) (examining coordination of
federal agricultural policies for farmland preservation, farm management, wetland
17
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ing well-established federal and state powers, such as police
power,48 Commerce Clause,49 and federal and state taxes.50  These
exercises of federal and state powers make legislation and regula-
tions to recognize and impose private burdens by establishing mu-
tual sustainability practices for, imposing restrictive obligations on,
requesting conditional demands from, granting offsetting benefits
to, and strongly urging innovative design and construction meth-
ods.51  While the public and government are waiting to make legis-
lation and regulation, American business and real estate developers
and other business organizations will continue to meet consumer,
commercial, industrial and institutional demands by increasing
protection, and soil and water conversation); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy,
Policy Coordination and the Takings Clause: The Coordination of Natural Resource Pro-
grams Imposing Multiple Burdens on Farmers and Landowners, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 175, 175-233 (1992) (examining whether coordinated regulatory scheme im-
poses great burdens on farmers or landowners under Takings Clause, U.S. CONST.
AMEND. V, CL. 4.).
The nature and level of integration of national policies and their coordination
have been recognized as a challenge in less developed nations in finding solutions
agreeable to all governments, developers and business organizations. See George
William Mugwanya, Global Free Trade Vis-a-Vis Environmental Regulation and Sustaina-
ble Development: Reinvigorating Efforts Towards a More Integrated Approach, 14 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 401, 402-05 (1999) (recognizing impact of integrating fee trade, envi-
ronmental protection and social welfare in less developed nations and difficulty of
findings policy solution agreeable to all parties).  However, we expect that devel-
oped nations will not be much less contentious in that governments, developers
and business organizations will easily agree on integrating sustainable develop-
ment and environment policy and regulation; see also Robinson, supra note 1 (stat-
ing Standing Rock Sioux protests installation of pipeline); see also Shear, supra note
8 (stating President withdraws U.S. from climate agreement).
48. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 381 (1926) (rec-
ognizing use of police power to create zoning regulation).
49. U.S. CONST. ART. 1, CL. 9 (identifying Commerce Clause as source of gov-
ernment power).
50. See Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶ (30) (stating “[w]e do not
pretend that the process is easy or straightforward. Painful choices must be made.
Thus, in the final analysis, sustainable development must rest on political will.”).
Id.; see Bratspies, supra note 29, at 304.  Professor Bratspies describes the problems
that must be addressed and solved by government to develop an effective regula-
tory approach to development and environmental sustainability.  Professor Brat-
spies recognizes the limitations on an integrated approach by stating that:
The first is the belief that we can achieve sustainability by tinkering at the
margins of the existing social, economic, and legal systems (the Marginal
Fallacy). The second is the tendency to splinter each problem into dis-
crete pieces to be dealt with one at a time (the Splintered Fallacy). The
Marginal Fallacy limits our vision . . . .  The Splintered Fallacy creates a
multitude of legal fiefdoms . . . .  Both of these fallacies are deeply em-
bedded in legal thinking, and legal systems are routinely deployed in
their service.
Bratspies, supra note 29, at 304.
51. Committee on Incorporating Sustainability, supra note 10, at 25 (recogniz-
ing many sustainability goals and objectives can further my American environmen-
tal and conservation law).
18
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land and business development projects to provide beneficial
houses, offices, services, jobs, and other products.  However, in-
creasing development is simply an exercise of private property
rights, which, in turn, increases much unintended but unwanted
effects on land, natural resources, social welfare, and environmen-
tal quality driving the need for integrated sustainability policy and
regulation with codependent and interdependent regulatory
strands controlling development and protecting the environment.
B. Property Rights under the Common Law and Regulation
Land, real estate and business development and its wealth and
poverty receive much protection from federal constitutional guar-
antees protecting the exercise of private property rights of state
common law.  “Not only was owning one’s own land an indication
of social standing, it was considered essential to reach one’s ‘happi-
est and most productive potential.’”52  The existence and impor-
tance of property rights in American business and government are
not new as “[l]and ownership has thus been part of the American
dream since colonial Jamestown and Plymouth.”53  “As the Ameri-
can common law of property developed, the individual rights of the
property owner have remained strong” under American common
and Federal constitutional principles and, “[o]ne . . . own[s] . . . to
the center of the earth and as high as the heavens above.”54  Land
developers and owners exercise private property rights of real and
personal properties to provide both personal happiness55 and eco-
52. Steve P. Calandrillo, Chryssa V. Deliganis & Andrea Woods, Making “Smart
Growth” Smarter, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (2015) (finding ownership of
land necessity to achieve success in many American community). The sanctity of
private property rights has been watched over by courts and other branches of
government, but when the earth or survival of the planet is threatened, govern-
ment may need to rethink our property regime. See Carl J. Circo, Does Sustainability
Require a New Theory of Property Rights?, 58 KAN. L. REV. 91 (2009) (hereinafter
Circo-Property Rights) (stating “the extent to which sustainability requires a new
theory of property rights for the United States depends both on what model of
sustainability ultimately prevails in this country and on the degree to which prop-
erty rights doctrine clings to traditional and economic notions.”). Id. at 92.
53. Calandrillo, supra note 52, at 836 (finding ownership of property has been
importance since America was colony).
54. Id. (finding property has value other than as economic benefit to Ameri-
can landowners).
55. Circo-Green Building, supra note 17, at 734 (citing Cesar Pelli, Observa-
tions for Young Architects 9 (1999)) (recognizing social utility of buildings); see also
Alberto Perez-Gomez, Built upon Love: Architectural Longing After Ethics and Aesthetics
4-5 (2006) (espousing theory of architecture in which building practices “pursue a
functionalist utopia” marked by “seductive projects”).
19
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nomic benefits56 to the American public as well as the world.  The
economic benefits are tremendous throughout the world and
United States in the construction and building industries account
for “5-10% of employment at [the] national level and normally gen-
erates 5-15% of the . . . [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)].”57  Al-
though, the exercise of private property rights causes harm to
natural resources, environmental quality, land and social condi-
tions,58 this exercise also offers tremendous social and economic
benefits to society and must be treated in accordance with the fair-
ness and justice required of the Federal Constitution.
Although private property rights are established by state com-
mon law, the Federal Due Process,59 Takings Clause and other pro-
visions of the Federal Constitution protect private property rights
from unreasonable and confiscatory invasions and interferences by
governments.  Accordingly, federal and state governments must
weigh the constitutional protection granted the exercise of private
property rights in designing and implementing significant changes
re-proportioning the regulatory burdens of American government
and landowners under the design and implementation of sustaina-
ble development and environmental goals, objectives and man-
dates.60  This constitutional protection includes limitations on
56. Circo-Green Building, supra note 17, at 734 (citing Pekka Huovila et al.,
Buildings and Climate Change: Status, Challenges and Opportunities 1, U.N. ENV’T PRO-
GRAMME (2007)) (stating impact construction and real estate industries on national
economy).
57. Id. (giving findings showing real estate and construction industries have
tremendous economic impact on U.S. economy).
58. See Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶40 (stating
“[d]evelopment cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental resource base;
the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out of account the costs
of environmental destruction.”). Id.
59. U.S. CONST., AMEND. 5 & 14 (stating due process clauses of U.S.
Constitution).
60. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see infra Parts III
and IV and accompanying notes (discussing application of Takings Clause to land
use and other regulation).  After deciding Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court held
that a comprehensive zoning ordinance that reduced the value and marketability
of private property did not offend the United States Constitution. See Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).  In Village of Euclid, the
Court stated that the issue “is the ordinance invalid in that it violates the constitu-
tional protection ‘to the right of property in the appellee by attempted regulations
under the guise of the police power, which are unreasonable and confiscatory?’”
Id. at 381.
In Village of Euclid, the Court decided whether modern cities could address the
impact of technology, business development and industrial growth on neighbor-
hoods and other facilities by enacting a comprehensive zoning regulation. Id. at
387.  The constitutional challenge was caused by need of state and local govern-
ments to extend the boundary of exercises of police power to enact comprehensive
zoning regulations to address the impact of technology, business growth and in-
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exercises of eminent domain and regulatory powers by federal,
state and local governments that enact regulatory schemes to con-
trol land use, preserve natural resources, and protect environmen-
tal quality by restricting, prohibiting, or making demands of land
and business development projects and practices.61  Thus, inte-
grated development and environment sustainability regulation that
substantially alters the current proportionality of public and private
burdens implicates the protection of private property rights under
the Takings Clause.
dustry on local populations, facilities and institutions. Id. at 392 (quoting City of
Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 787-88 (1925)).  The Court highlighted the need to
address this impact by quoting the Supreme Court of Illinois that had stated that
“[t]he constantly increasing density of our urban populations, the multiplying
forms of industry, and the growing complexity of our civilization make it necessary
for the State, either directly or through some public agency by its sanction, to limit
individual activities to a greater extent than formerly.” Id. at 392 (quoting City of
Aurora, 149 N.E. at 788).  Almost a century later, federal, state and local govern-
ments are confronted with a more challenging need to address the threat to the
earth and humankind survival by harmful impact of business development, climate
change and energy consumption.  This harmful impact on the environment, popu-
lation and social welfare requires federal and state policy-makers to extend farther
the boundaries of police power and federal power, respectively, to enact integrated
sustainability regulation subject to the Takings Clause.
61. See Calandrillo, supra note 52, at 837 (explaining use of smart growth as
regulatory scheme to manage and control land use and growth and their impact
on land, natural resources and environmental quality).
Other regulatory schemes design to implement sustainability raise or impli-
cate legal and constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Adam Soliman, Achieving Sus-
tainability Through Community Based Fisheries Management Schemes: Legal and
Constitutional Analysis, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 273 (2014) (examining “some
of legal requirements for implementing successful community-based fisheries man-
agement (CBFM) capability within a management regime based on individual
transferable quotas (ITQs)”). Id. at 274; Juli Ponce, Urban Planning and Legal Frame-
work for Sustainable Communities: Affordable Housing, Social Cohesion and Ghettos, 42
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 75 (2014) (examining “an important aspect associated to land
use regulations: direct or indirect discrimination in the use of land, urban segrega-
tion and creation of ghettos . . . . This is, obviously, an issue of the greatest interest
all around the world.”). Id. at 78; Richard Grosso, Regulating for Sustainability: The
Legality of Carrying Capacity-Based Environmental and Land Use Permitting Decisions, 35
NOVA L. REV. 711 (2011) (concluding that “Florida can only sustain itself and avoid
economic and ecological crisis if its policies and laws respect and reflect realities of
the laws of nature, the finite (and shrinking) amount of land in this peninsula, and
its ability to pay for more growth . . . .”). Id. at 775; Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust
Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 287 (2010) (explaining cap-and-trade system of regulating greenhouse
gas emissions has advantages and disadvantages and public trust  to federal legisla-
tion); Tom Pierce, Comment, A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of
No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability,
19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93 (1997) (“conclud[ing] that no-growth ordinances enacted
to implement sustainability goals are constitutional . . . , [but] municipalities must
create an irrefutable link between land use management and science of sus-
tainability [and] . . . must overcome entrenched and unrealistic judicial assump-
tions regarding population growth.”). Id. at 96.
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Integrated sustainability policy and regulation must be devel-
oped by federal and state legislatures.  Federal, state and local legis-
lative bodies continue to make traditional land use, environmental
and natural resources regulation that may unintentionally achieve a
few sustainability objectives and goals.62  Congress and state legisla-
tures must eventually face the ultimate question to enact integrated
sustainability policy. Simply, this question is whether integrated sus-
tainability regulation that must include traditional and eventually
impose new regulatory mandates on business, organizations, land
development, energy exploration, and commercial activities can
withstand constitutional muster under the Takings Clause to pro-
tect current and future generations.  Of future challenges to inte-
grated sustainability regulation, the takings analysis will review one
or more inseparable regulatory strands that impose both traditional
and new obligations.63  The numerous strands cannot impose pub-
lic burdens that should be borne by government on landowners
under the Takings Clause guarantee of fairness and justice.
Throughout the 20th century, the Court reviewed land use, natural
resources, environmental, social and other policy and regulation
under the Takings Clause.  Principally, the Court was requested to
decide whether business developers and landowners should be pro-
tected from burdensome land use and other public obligations by
giving more protection to the right to receive just compensation,
which, in turn, gives more protection to private property rights.64
Development and environmental sustainability is a set of new cir-
cumstances subject to takings jurisprudence that contains mostly
objective standards of review and principles of law.  From that per-
spective, the Court’s takings decisions offer insight on whether inte-
grated sustainability policy and regulation enacted as a bundle of
traditional and new regulatory strands to broadly effect environ-
62. See Committee on Incorporating Sustainability, supra note 10, at 25 (rec-
ognizing federal government had no sustainability goals and objectives could be
measured by federal standards).
63. See also Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶40 (recognizing policy-
makers and other government institutions should not treat “[e]nvironment and
development [as] . . . separate challenges,” and concluding “[t]hese problems can-
not be treated separately by fragmented institutions and policies”). Id.
64. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(limiting coastal zone management regulation that take all beneficial use of prop-
erty); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (restricting use of land dedica-
tion conditions by requiring a justifiable need); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (restricting use adjudicated monetary
exactions of land use regulatory schemes to mitigate environmental harm); Horne
v. United States Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (restricting
farm subsidy programs required farmers to give surplus crops to government to
stabilize market).
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ment, social and economic change on private property and busi-
ness interests can withstand constitutional muster under the
Takings Clause.  Thus, takings theories will decide whether the bur-
den borne by landowners under integrated development and envi-
ronmental sustainability regulation is a public burden that should
be borne by government.
Takings issues that normally involve more immediate exercises
of private property rights must eventually weigh the need to con-
sider the environmental and development sustainability interests of
future generations.  The Takings Clause guarantees fairness and
justice by proportioning burdens or obligations borne by landown-
ers and community to address more  immediate economic, social,
and environmental needs.65  This fairness and justice, as constitu-
tional equity, may not include intergenerational equity among pre-
sent and future generations of Americans.66  Of future generations,
the Court may as usual leave any policy concerns solely to Congress
and state legislatures or consider its past interpretations to contain
inter-generational equity sustaining our American capitalism and
constitutionalism.67  However, the Court may still be faced with the
question of whether the state has sufficient interest and power to
protect unborn generations by preserving the earth and its environ-
ment and resources.  We will not make an argument here but make
the readers aware of the need to consider future generations in in-
tegrated development and environmental sustainability policy-
making.
C. Takings Clause and Public Burdens to Be Borne
Government provides public needs and must do so with fair-
ness and justice to landowners and the whole community who
should be required to bear requisite public burdens guaranteed by
the Takings Clause.  The Takings Clause guarantee is that govern-
ment cannot take land or its benefits by imposing public burdens
on landowners and developers.68  The Court stated that the Taking
65. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40 (guaranteeing real and personal property owners
do not pay for public needs or responsibilities of government).
66. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 109, 109 at n.6
(citing Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878)) (emphasis added) (noting
“[t]he Fifth Amendment must be applied with ‘reference to the uses for which the
property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the commu-
nity, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future’”). Id.
67. See id. (recognizing Takings Clause could consider immediate future but
not several generation of intragenerational equity).
68. Id. (concluding land and personal property owners cannot be required to
bear burdens or obligations of government).
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Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”69  The Takings Clause
imposes a condition on the exercise of eminent domain and regula-
tory powers and when the condition is triggered by a condemnation
under eminent domain or an unintended taking by regulation for a
public use, the Takings Clause mandates for landowners and other
holders of property rights70 the right to receive just compensation
for the land or other property taken by government.71  Thus, the
exercise of eminent domain to take real and personal property by
condemnation may raise a few issues regarding the constitutionality
of the takings or condemnation.
Government must exercise regulatory power to further public
needs and objectives by restricting or limiting the exercises of pri-
vate property rights, though government is not exercising eminent
domain power.  A government regulation that severely limits the
exercise of property rights can amount to a takings of private prop-
erty for public use under regulatory takings theory of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon (Mahon).72  In Mahon, the Court was asked to
69. Id. (stating purpose of Takings Clause).
70. See, e.g., Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40 (deciding whether U.S. Navy had taken
personal property for public use); Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538
U.S. 216 (2003) (deciding whether small amounts of money collected from law-
yer’s trust accounts taking of personal property); Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at  2586 (decid-
ing whether adjudicated money exaction or fee in lieu of dedication imposed on
development permit was taking of personal property); Horne v. United States De-
partment of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (Horne II) (deciding whether
transfer of raisins to government facility was physical takings of personal property).
For an analysis of Horne I that was a physical takings decided after Koontz that
was regulatory takings, see James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Aftermath of
Koontz and Conditional Demands: A Per Se Test, Personal Property and Another Condi-
tional Demand, 23 WIDENER L. REV. 37 (2016) (stating “[t]his article examines the
expansion of Takings Clause jurisprudence by the Roberts Court in the immediate
aftermath of Koontz by analyzing how the Roberts Court decided that a condition
of a regulatory scheme was so intrusive that a standard of review exceeding that of
Nollan [v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)] and Dolan [v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)] would always be appropriate to determine the validity
of the condition.”). Id. at 39.
71. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (concluding government can take by eminent do-
main and regulatory powers).
72. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing regulatory takings theory).  The Court
decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. during the substantive due process era when the
Court was applying much closer scrutiny of regulation restricting or limiting pri-
vate property rights and economic rights. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905) (regarding state interference with contract rights of employment); But see
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (holding no unreasonable state
interference with economic rights by imposing price controls).  The Court sig-
naled the close of the Lochner era in 1937 when the Court decided to not closely
scrutinize legislatures on enacting economic regulation.  West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (explaining state interference with contract
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determine whether an exercise of state police power to enact legis-
lation was a taking of private property for a public use.73  The state
of Pennsylvania had required the Pennsylvania Coal Co. to leave a
pillar of coal under Mahon’s house to prevent subsidence, but
Mahon had purchased the house without acquiring the subsurface
rights immediately below the residence.74  The Court concluded
that a government regulation can go too far by taking private prop-
erty for a public use,75 though the regulation may further a legiti-
mate government need to protect the welfare of state citizens.76
However, the Court found that legislation was giving Mahon a right
that he had not acquired under the contract in the purchase of the
house.77  The Court chose not to apply a general proposition and
relied on an objective test to determine whether the burdens that
required the landowner to leave profitable coal in the ground
amounts to a government takings of private property by regula-
tion.78  Regulatory takings theory protects the right to receive just
compensation by objectively scrutinizing the effects of regulation
on real and personal property interests of landowners who were ex-
ercising private property rights.79  Thus, regulatory takings theory
has developed since Mahon to limit burdensome regulatory inva-
rights of economic relationship by imposing minimum wage for women).  In West
Coast Hotel Co., the Court stated that:
[T]hat times without number we have said that the legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that every possible pre-
sumption is in favor of its validity, and that, though the court may hold
views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled
unless palpably in excess of legislative power.
West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 398.
However, one commentator suggests that our property rights regime may not
permit the optimum solution to sustainable development and environment. See
Circo-Property Rights, supra note 52, at 115 (finding “[t]he net result may well be
that U.S. concepts of private property cannot fully conform to sustainability with-
out a distinct shift to relational perspectives that currently exist only at the fringes
of property theory as applied in this country.”). Id. at 92.
73. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (recognizing Mahon was novel issue under Tak-
ings Clause).
74. See id. at 412 (recognizing Mahon was novel issue under Takings).
75. See id. at 415 (concluding regulation can amount to taking of private
property).
76. See id. at 416 (concluding regulation can amount to taking of private
property though government furthers legitimate state need).
77. See id. (recognizing government cannot use regulation to grant public
benefit that should have been acquired as contractual right).
78. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 416 (applying objective standard rather
than bright line test).
79. Id. (explaining purpose of regulatory takings theory under Takings Clause
of Fifth Amendment).
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sions of, interferences with, and demands on exercises of private
property right under the Takings Clause.80
Today, the federal, state and local policy-makers are facing an
intractable public policy concern that demands Congress and state
legislatures fully recognize the need to advance sustainable develop-
ment and environmental interests.  Congress and state legislatures
must design and implement integrated sustainability policy and leg-
islation to address a mounting policy conflict between sustainable
environmental and development interests and business and land
development rights.  This need for policy and legislation that has
yet to be fully developed still leads one to ask whether the Takings
Clause will permit government to add development and environ-
mental sustainability policy and regulation to existing traditional
land use, environmental, and other legislation imposed on business
and land developers and owners to preserve and protect environ-
mental, economic, social, and other resources for current and fu-
ture generations.81  The Takings Clause ensures business and land
developers and owners do not unfairly or unjustly bear the public
burdens for sustainable development and environment.82  These
public burdens are imposed by federal and state legislative acts, ad-
ministrative regulations and local ordinances demanding property
interests from, imposing restrictions on, and granting benefits and
incentives to business and land developers and owners.83  The
Court must decide whether the burdens of integrated sustainability
policy borne by these developers and owners are proportional to
the impact of the harm of business and land development on the
community, state, or nation.  Local, state and federal governments
must set forth a specific set of public goals and objectives to address
80. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 478 U.S. at 124 (setting forth a three-prongs
test deciding whether government regulation amounts to taking of private prop-
erty by land use and other regulations).
81. See Dawn Jordan, Exploring How Today’s Development Affects Future Genera-
tions Around the Globe: In This Issue: Sustainable Development in the Urban Environment:
Standing on Their Own: The Parallel Rights of Young People to Participate in Planning
Processes and Defend Those Rights, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, 41, 41-42 (2010)
(noting need for intergenerational equity in addressing impact of sustainable de-
velopment and environment on future generations).  Sustainable development
and environment must include future generations. Id.  Consequently, the govern-
ment and public consider and the Court may need to decide whether past and
current generations are obligated by the Federal Constitution to protect future
generations so they inherit more than mismanaged land use, degraded natural
resources, polluted water and air and poor social conditions.
82. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (stating purpose of Takings Clause to protect
private property).
83. See id. (stating legislative and regulatory sources of government’s burdens
imposed on real and personal property owners).
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social, economic and environmental harm to sustainable develop-
ment and environmental interests, such as environmental quality.
Depending on takings theory, the Court may need to analyze
means-ends relationship to determine whether integrated sus-
tainability regulation furthers its legislative purpose and is justified
by public needs.84 Yet when the interference with private property
rights raises no issues regarding means-ends relationship, the Court
analyzes the nature of the interference and the economic and fi-
nancial effects of regulation on exercises of private property
rights.85  Although, federal and state governments have not fully in-
tegrated the traditional and new regulatory strands to establish inte-
grated sustainability policy and regulation, the Court’s takings
jurisprudence provides much insight into how the Court might re-
view an integrated environmental and development sustainability
policy and regulation86 under takings theories. Such a ruling would
provide fairness and justice to business and land developers and
owners engaged in business and land development or another activ-
ity related to a property interest.
III. TAKINGS THEORIES UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Taking theories and principles determine whether government
can impose restrictions on, request conditional demands of, and
provide offsetting benefits to business and real estate development
solely to protect land use, natural resources, and environmental
quality.  Regulatory takings theory provides much deference to the
land use and growth management objectives that are furthered by
zoning and other land use regulation.  On one hand, regulatory
takings theory can treat highly burdensome restrictions on develop-
ment as unlawful interferences with private property rights to fur-
ther legitimate public objectives.  On the other hand, physical
takings theory imposes a per se or categorical duty on government
to not take private property, both personal and real property, by
occupying the land, permitting others to occupy the land, or tak-
84. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982) (concluding Court need not make means-ends analysis since ends or objec-
tives of regulation are weighed in applying physical takings theory).
85. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (explaining how interpretations
of Takings Clause could affect making and implementation of integrated develop-
ment and environment sustainability policy and regulation).
86. May, supra note 9, at 21.  Professor May reviewed environmental cases and
concluded that “[n]one of the environmental cases decided thus far during the
tenure of Chief Justice Roberts engage sustainability . . . .  I conclude that factors
having little or nothing to do with sustainability per se are at the heart of these
results.”).
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ings an ownership interest in the property under a regulatory
scheme.
A. Regulatory Takings Analysis with Deference to Sustainability
It would take a few decades for the Court to develop Mahon’s
objective test that would analyze the effects of government regula-
tion on private property rights and its economic and financial ef-
fects.  In 1978, the Court developed and applied a much broader
regulatory takings analysis in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York (Penn Central)87 to decide whether the City of New York’s his-
toric preservation regulation imposed public burdens on the land-
owner, the petitioner, by restricting the development of its private
property.88  The Court established a three-prong test to determine
whether the City of New York committed a regulatory takings by
applying three factors: (1) character of regulation, (2) economic
impact of regulation, and (3) interference with investment-backed
expectations by the regulation.89  These factors are the Penn Central
inquiry and were applied to determine whether the historic preser-
vation regulation that restricted the development of Penn Central
Station amounted to a taking of private property for public use.90
The Court concluded that the historic preservation regulation did
not amount to a taking of private property for public use.91  The
first test on the Penn Central inquiry is the character of government
regulation that examines the interference of the regulation with
private property rights in furtherance of public policies or govern-
ment needs.92  The Court must determine whether sustainability
regulation are overly burdensome interference with private prop-
erty rights and the benefits of this regulation can further sustaina-
ble development and environmental objectives without the
payment of just compensation.
The Court often defers to state and municipal government pol-
icy-makers on the purposes and needs for land use and other regu-
latory schemes to further legitimate state objectives.  In Penn
87. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (applying regulatory
taking theory to historic district regulation under objective standard of Mahon).
88. See id. at 123 (setting forth regulatory taking issue).
89. Id. at 124-25 (listing three factors of Penn Central inquiry that are applied
to determine regulatory takings).
90. Id. at 123 (stating primary issue that must be decided to determine regula-
tory takings under Penn Central inquiry).
91. Id. at 138 (stating conclusion to application of Penn Central inquiry to his-
toric preservation regulation).
92. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (stating first factor of Penn Central
inquiry).
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Central, the Court noted that Mahon was decided under the interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations principle.93  This Court
also recognized that an ad hoc, factual inquiry had been applied to
determine whether a government regulation imposes public bur-
dens on land-owners by denying the right to receive just compensa-
tion.94  The Court had granted much deference to government to
impose land use regulation that did not impose public burdens on
business and real estate developers to require government to pay
just compensation.95  Still, these burdens continued to raise the
question whether the right to receive just compensation gave
enough protection to private property rights from restrictive land
use, environmental and other regulation that deny landowners the
right to receive just compensation.  The Rehnquist Court provided
an answer in the negative.
B. Regulatory Takings Tests with Less Deference for
Sustainability
The Rehnquist Court imposed limits on the deference that
could be accorded under the Takings Clause to specific kinds of
environmental and land use regulation.  The Court imposed
heightened scrutiny on two classes of regulation to determine
whether government land use, environmental and other regulation
amounts to a regulatory takings in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council (Lucas)96 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (Dolan).97  In Lucas, the
Court established a per se test for a category of government regula-
93. Id. at 127 (recognizing Mahon was decided under third factor and not first
factor that address level of interference with property rights).
94. See id. at 124 (noting Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. applied three fac-
tors of Penn Central inquiry that is an objective standard).  “[T]his Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice
and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons.” See id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
95. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131; see City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (refusing to apply rough proportionality
test to application for land use permit that has been delayed by local government);
see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Debendictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (agreeing
with facial takings challenge to constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Subsidence Act
that was similar to the Kohler Act that had been regulatory takings of private prop-
erty by regulation in Mahon).
96. 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (applying per se test or categorical rule to
determine whether government had taken property by regulation).
97. 512 U.S. 3724, 385 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny test to deter-
mine whether government had taken private property by adjudicatory decision in
land use management scheme).
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tion that denies all economically viable use98 of private ocean front
property that could have been developed under the land title or
deed at common law.99  The Court applied common law back-
ground doctrine to firmly justify the per se test that declares a class
of environmental, land use and other regulation a regulatory tak-
ings when the landowner is totally prohibited from using the land
for economic uses100 such as land development, that would have
been permitted under the deed or title to the land at common
law.101  In Lucas, the Court applied a per se test that is a higher
standard of review to determine if government denies all economi-
cally viable use of private property.102 Lucas established a categori-
cal duty or per se test that was absolutely not deferential to
government policy-makers when compared to the reasonableness
test of Penn Central Transp. Co. and earlier decisions.103
Many kinds of land use regulation did not need a means-ends
analysis as strict as the per se test to scrutinize the relationship be-
tween the impact of development on the community and the gov-
ernment justifications for the regulation.  The Court needed to
98. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (explaining “[w]here the State seeks to sustain
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with.”). Id.; But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2002) (hold-
ing wetland regulations were not takings of all economically viable use if regula-
tions permitted landowners to build one or more houses on tract of land).
99. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (noting Court did not allow government to
terminate property rights that permitted owner to develop land).
100. Id. at 1028-29; But see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (permitting government agency to impose in-
terim development control or land use moratorium, subject to review under Penn
Central inquiry and not per se test of Lucas).
101. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (noting land development had been permit-
ted at common law under terms and conditions of deed or title).
102. Id. (applying a per se takings to determine if land use and other regula-
tion deny all economically beneficial use of the land).  However, in Lingle v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc., the Court concluded that a rent control statute was not subject to
heightened scrutiny and that the substantially advances a legitimate state interest
language of Agins v. City of Tiburon, was not heightened scrutiny. See Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 545 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
103. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131 (finding Lucas’ per se test
does not defer to policy-makers in making environmental, land use and other reg-
ulation).  The Court stated that “[a]ppellants concede that the decisions sus-
taining other land use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are
reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘tak-
ing[.]’” Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)) (illustrating
75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (showing 87 1/2% diminution in value); Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 426 U.S. at 674 n.8).
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establish an intermediate standard of review that has a level of scru-
tiny between the strict per se test and deferential reasonable test to
analyze the relationship between the impact of development and
community needs for the regulation.  In Dolan, the Court estab-
lished an intermediate standard of review that examined the rela-
tionship between public needs and an adjudicatory decision to
impose land dedication conditions on issuance of a development
permit that requested a right-of-way in the expansion of a retail bus-
iness.104  The Court recognized that land dedication conditions are
adjudicatory decisions and require the landowner to give an inter-
est in land to receive government benefits, and were a part of lawful
land use regulation.105  The Court, however, concluded that the
land dedication conditions were not justified by the impact of the
development, expanding the retail business, on the community.106
The Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that
prohibits government from imposing an unlawful condition on the
exercise of fundamental right to justify intermediate scrutiny or
rough proportionality test to scrutinize the connection between the
land dedication conditions and community needs.107  In contrast to
a deferential standard permitting a lesser connection, the rough
proportionality test requires government to establish a closer con-
nection between land dedication conditions and community’s
needs to justify imposing these conditions.108 Lucas and Dolan de-
pended on common law and constitutional doctrines, respectively,
to justify higher standards of review for government regulation that
is challenged as a takings of private property for public use without
the payment of just compensation.
104. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (stating “[w]e think a term such as ‘rough
proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
105. See id. at 385 (recognizing use and purposes of land dedication condi-
tions in land use management regulatory scheme).
106. Id. (concluding relationship or connection did not exist between land
dedication conditions and impact of development on community).
107. Id. (explaining “[u]nder well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional condi-
tions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public
use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where
the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”) (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High
School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
108. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (contrasting rough proportionality test with
rational basis test that is more deferential).
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Government regulation and decisions can take private prop-
erty for public use, amounting to an extremely burdensome inter-
ference with the landowner’s control of a specific private property
right.  Government actions that can severely limit the right to exclu-
sive use of the bundle of property rights may effect a regulatory
takings by permitting others to invade the private property.109  In
Kaiser Aetna v. United States (Kaiser Aetna),110 a landowner that con-
nected its pond to navigable waters was required to give access to
this pond to the public, even though the landowner had relied on
the government’s consent in connecting the pond to the navigable
waters.111  The Court held that the navigable servitude imposed by
the government was a taking of private property for public use and
interfered with the right to exclude others was a physical invasion of
the property under regulatory takings theory.112  The Court con-
cluded that government actions can amount to a burdensome regu-
latory takings by severely restricting the right to exclude others that
permits the owners to demand the removal of uninvited persons.113
The physical invasion did not require government to take an inter-
est in land or occupy the fast land that is located above high water
edge of navigable waters.114  Although the regulation or decision
does not deny all beneficial use or demand an interest in land, this
109. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1979) (concluding
Court should treated government decisions as more intrusive on use of property
right than mere interference with property right under first factor of Penn Central
inquiry).
110. 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (establishing regulatory takings by physical invasion
rather than Penn Central inquiry or physical takings test).
111. Id. at 167-69 (stating relevant facts).
112. Id. at 179-80 (finding right to exclude others is important property right
that should be protected as physical invasion).  “[W]e hold that the ‘right to ex-
clude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compen-
sation.” Id.
113. See id. at 178-79 (stating Court’s conclusion on effect of government deci-
sion on exercise private property rights).  “This is not a case in which the Govern-
ment is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial
devaluation of petitioners’ private property; rather, the imposition of the naviga-
tional servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the pri-
vately owned marina.” Id. at 180.
114. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (concluding government was not taking fast
land requiring it to exercise eminent domain power and pay just compensation).
In Kaiser Aetna, the Court found that the government decision requiring public
access to private land that was connected to navigable waters was unique. Id. at
178. “Here, the Government’s attempt to create a public right of access to the
improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for naviga-
tion as to amount to a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178.
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regulation or decision can effect a regulatory takings by being an
extremely burdensome interference with private property rights.
Some takings precedents would allow much less deference to
integrated development and environmental sustainability regula-
tion and deny government the power to increase the private bur-
dens already borne by business and land developers without paying
just compensation. Lucas, Dolan and Kaiser Aetna are lines of regula-
tory takings cases that do not rely on the Penn Central inquiry and
allow government to increase the burdens borne by landowners in
limited circumstances.  Foremost, Lucas and Dolan show the Court
is unwilling to allow government to rely entirely on deference when
state and local land use and environmental regulation permits gov-
ernment to deny all economically beneficial uses or request an in-
terest in land, respectively.  In addition, Kaiser Aetna demonstrates
that the Court is unwilling to permit government to rely on defer-
ence when landowners are forced to share the use of private prop-
erty with the public, though government had provided a non-
compensatory permit to make private property more accessible to
the landowner.  In Lucas, Dolan and Kaiser Aetna, the Court narrows
the Penn Central inquiry by deciding that government is not owed
deference to forceful regulation and conditional demands to avoid
paying just compensation for acquiring public benefits.  This lack
of deference requires environmental, land use and natural re-
sources planners and managers to fully establish purpose and needs
to create each strand of an integrated development and environ-
mental sustainability regulation.  Thus, these planners and manag-
ers must thoroughly examine and respond to financial, investment,
and economic burdens suffered by business developers and land-
owners in complying with various regulatory strands of an inte-
grated sustainability regulation.
C. Physical Takings Analysis with a Duty to Pay for Sustainability
Government may need to occupy or cause the occupation of
private property to further legitimate government objectives that
provide social and other benefits to the public under integrated
sustainability regulation.  The government’s need to impose the
regulation is not a question but only the means of occupying or
causing an occupation of the land that leads to a takings claim as a
physical takings.115  In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
115. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (stating Court “conclude[d] that a permanent physical occupation author-
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(Loretto),116 the New York state legislature enacted a statute permit-
ting cable television companies to install antennas on rooftops of
private buildings and prohibiting landlords from interfering with
these installations.117  The appellants, who were owners of these
buildings, challenged this state statute as an unwarranted interfer-
ence with their rooftops.118  The Court held that the statute that
permitted the cable television companies to attach an antenna to
the rooftop was a permanent physical occupation that effected a
physical takings of private property for public use.119  The Court
reasoned that government cannot allow the public, individual, or
agency to occupy private property to achieve a public goal or objec-
tive.120  Moreover, the Court does not review public interests  to de-
cide whether a government regulation or decision amounts to a
physical takings.121  Thus, Loretto does not permit government to
occupy private property and does not consider public ends for mak-
ing regulation when government occupies private property.
Integrated development and environmental sustainability pol-
icy goals and objectives do not matter to the Court in a physical
takings.  The Court analyzes whether integrated sustainability regu-
lation permits government to increase the owner’s burdens by occu-
pying the land of business and land developers and avoid paying
just compensation.  Loretto is one of a line of takings cases that limit
the Penn Central inquiry by not broadly allowing government to jus-
tify its objectives when the government occupies land.122  Simply,
ized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may
serve.”).
116. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
117. Id. at 423 (reviewing relevant facts of Loretto).
118. Id. at 424 (reviewing relevant facts setting forth physical takings claim).
119. Id. at 441 (stating Court’s holding on physical takings issue in Loretto).
The Court stated, “Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule
that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the
property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and
the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other
category of property regulation.” Id.
120. Id. at 426 (recognizing Takings Clause does not permit government to
occupy private property to further public interest).  “The historical rule that a per-
manent physical occupation of another’s property is a taking has more than tradi-
tion to commend it.  Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of
invasion of an owner’s property interests.” Id. at 435.
121. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (recognizing Court does not consider public
interests in deciding physical takings by stating “our cases uniformly have found a
taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner.”). Id. at 434-35.
122. See id. at 441 (distinguishing nature of takings in Loretto from regulatory
takings of Penn Central Transp. Co.).
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the objectives are not relevant when government occupies private
property. Loretto is a physical takings case that shows the Court is
totally unwilling to allow government or the public to occupy pri-
vate property under a government mandate providing a needed
public benefit.123  Therefore, the Court is unwilling to allow govern-
ment to obligate landowners and developers by a physical occupa-
tion as a strand of regulation in an integrated sustainability
regulation that ultimately denies these developers the right to re-
ceive just compensation when complying with several strands or
kinds of regulation.
IV. IMPACT OF TAKINGS CLAUSE ON STRANDS OF INTEGRATED
SUSTAINABILITY REGULATION
Integrated development and environment sustainability regula-
tion restricts the exercise of private property rights by limiting the
qualities and characteristics of business and land development
projects and construction practices and methods to protect land
uses, natural resources, environmental quality, social welfare, cli-
mate change and other public needs.  Impact exactions, land use
and zoning controls, coastal zone environmental management and
other strands of integrated sustainability regulation have been suc-
cessfully and unsuccessfully challenged as burdensome restrictions
on the exercise of private property rights to develop and use land
and natural resources.  These challenges to a distinct stand-alone
strand offer much insight into how the Court must respond to inte-
grated development and environmental sustainability regulation
that will limit or restrict land and business development projects
and construction practices to provide or establish a sustainable de-
velopment and environment.  We do not think the Federal Consti-
tution or Court will permit regulation to prohibit or highly restrict
business and land development but may permit restrictions on de-
velopment and construction characteristics, such as social impact,
energy use, waste production, and location.  Assuredly, business
and land development will not cease, but the question is what kinds
of restrictions are too burdensome to be borne by land and busi-
ness developers and should be borne by the public by paying just
compensation.
123. Id. at 434-35 (concluding physical takings theory does not allow govern-
ment to occupy private property).
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A. Conditional Demands to Manage Social and Ecological
Impact
The Court must decide whether adjudicated conditional de-
mands imposed by an integrated development and environmental
policy and regulation are less offensive to the Takings Clause than
adjudicated conditional demands imposed by a single regulatory
strand that had been found unconstitutional earlier.  In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission (Nollan),124 the Court applied the Tak-
ings Clause to a land dedication condition that was imposed on a
development permit to grant an easement to allow the public access
to the beach by allowing them to walk across private beachfront
property.125  The Court concluded that the relationship between
the land dedication condition and its public objective or purpose
did not establish the appropriate connection.126  The Court estab-
lished an essential nexus test to determine whether the land dedica-
tion condition was sufficiently related to its government objective of
public access along the beach shoreline.127  It did not stop there.
In Dolan, the Takings Clause was applied to two land dedication
conditions that were adjudicatory decisions requesting easements
to establish bicycle pathway and drainage right-of-way.128  The land
dedication conditions requested a bicycle path right-of-way and
drainage easement on a retail development site.129  According to
the Court, these dedication conditions sought to further a recrea-
tional or social purpose by allowing citizens to move freely through
retail business site.130  The Court was not willing to conclude that
the impact of retail business development on Fanno Creek justified
the community need for the land dedication conditions and estab-
124. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
125. Id. at 827 (stating relevant facts setting forth regulatory takings claims).
126. Id. at 837 (concluding lack of sufficient relationship between land dedi-
cation condition and its purpose to further access to beach). “In short, unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use, but ‘an out-and-out
plan of extortion.’” Id.
127. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (establishing standard of review to determine
connection between land dedication and its public purpose).  “Similarly here, the
lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building re-
striction converts that purpose to something other than what it was.  The purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid gov-
ernmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.” Id.
128. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-89 (stating relevant facts that were the grounds for
takings claims).
129. Id. at 380 (reviewing relevant facts identifying land dedication conditions
imposed on Mrs. Dolan’s retail site).
130. Id. at 394-95 (reviewing relevant facts to set forth takings claim under
burdensome land dedication conditions).
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lished the rough proportionality test to determine the connection
between the land dedication condition and public need for this
condition.131  The Court concluded the connection was not suffi-
cient to justify the land dedication conditions by applying the
rough proportionality test to determine whether the public need
for the land dedication conditions were justified in extent and de-
gree to the impact of development on a site.132  Thus, the Court
sought to establish a means-ends analysis to ensure that government
objectives and needs were sufficiently related to the specific regula-
tion providing public benefits without the payment of just
compensation.
The Court was silent for almost twenty years on whether Nollan
and Dolan applied to monetary exactions and fees in lieu of dedica-
tion that were imposed by an adjudicatory decision-making process.
The Court answered this question in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District (Koontz)133 and did so in the affirmative.  The
131. Id. at 395-96 (concluding land dedication conditions are not justified by
impact of development).
We think a term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates what
we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
Id. at 391.
132. Id. at 394-95 (finding city did not set forth public needs that were caused
by impact of development).
Cities have long engaged in the commendable task of land use planning,
made necessary by increasing urbanization, particularly in metropolitan
areas such as Portland. The city’s goals of reducing flooding hazards and
traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but
there are outer limits to how this may be done.
Id. at 396.
133. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586
(2013).  For an analysis of Koontz, see, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy,
Extending Regulatory Takings Theory by Applying Constitutional Doctrine and Elevating
Takings Precedents to Justify Higher Standards of Review in Koontz, 22 WIDENER L. REV.
33 (2016) (examining Court’s use of constitutional doctrine to justify higher stan-
dards of review for conditional demands that require payment of money); Theo-
dore Lynch, Rise of the Super-Legislature: Demanding a More Exacting Monetary
Exaction, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 275, 275-76 (2015) (noting that
“[t]hough not all consequences are known at this time, the instant decision seems
to give further power to the individual landowner, who may now have an easier
time ignoring the negative externalities that his developments have on the sur-
rounding community.”); Colin W. Maguire, Koontz And The End Of Justice Stevens’
Private Property Regulation Policy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (2015) (“This anal-
ysis will attempt to show that the environmental aspect of these cases is often inci-
dental to the majority of the Court. This makes the impact no less real, but Koontz
also may force us as a country to embrace environmental impact. This analysis will
first focus on sustainable water resource policies—including the CWA—as a con-
duit for aggressive government action towards property owners.”).
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Court established a closer connection between adjudicated mone-
tary exactions including fees in lieu of dedication and public need
for imposing these kinds of  exactions on or off the tract of land.134
The Court applied the rough proportionality test to determine the
existence of a sufficient relationship between adjudicated money
exactions to protect water resources of the drainage district and en-
vironmental impact of land development project on the drainage
district.135  The impact of the land development must cause the
need for the adjudicated money exactions or fees in lieu of a land
dedication condition.136  The land development project must cre-
ate a regional or district need for a monetary exaction to finance
mitigation and other work that was offsite of petitioner’s develop-
ment project.137  The Court extended Nollan’s essential nexus and
Dolan’s rough proportionality tests to cover adjudicated monetary
exactions and fees in lieu of dedications that were attached to an
identifiable property interests in Koontz.
An integrated sustainability regulation that includes condi-
tional demands among its regulatory strands must have a sufficient
relationship to a public purpose and need on or off the tract or site
to survive constitutional scrutiny under the Takings Clause.  This
sufficient relationship requires integrated sustainability policy to
give valid environmental and other purposes and show the commu-
nity needs were harms or harmful effects caused by land and busi-
ness development.  In Nollan, the Court was also not willing under
134. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (noting Court determined relationship be-
tween adjudicated money exactions and public needs justifying these exactions).
135. Id. (measuring relationship between regulation and need for this regula-
tion by community).
Such so-called “in lieu of” fees are utterly commonplace . . . and they are
functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions.  For that rea-
son and those that follow, we reject respondent’s argument and hold that
so-called “monetary exactions” must satisfy the nexus and rough propor-
tionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (citing Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of
American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 S.M.U. L. REV.
177, 202-03 (2006)).
136. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (stating that impact of land development must
cause need for regulation).  “Nollan and Dolan accommodate both realities by al-
lowing the government to condition approval of a permit on the dedication of
property to the public so long as there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’
between the property that the government demands and the social costs of the
applicant’s proposal.” Id. (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 and Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837).
137. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593 (“In the alternative, the District told petitioner
that he could proceed with the development as proposed, building on 3.7 acres
and deeding a conservation easement to the government on the remainder of the
property, if he also agreed to hire contractors to make improvements to District-
owned land several miles away.”).
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the essential nexus test to conclude that a social or recreational pur-
pose or objective to establish public access across private property
to get to the beach had a sufficient connection to the grant of an
easement under a land dedication condition.138  In Dolan, the
Court was even less willing under the rough proportionality test to
conclude that recreational or social needs for two land dedication
conditions were a sufficient connection to justify a grant of an ease-
ment based upon the impact of business or land development on
the community.139  Finally, in Koontz, the Court went even further
by extending the rough proportionality test to cover money exac-
tions and fees in lieu of dedications made by adjudicatory decisions
but remained tentative on whether the rough proportionality test
applies to legislated conditional demands or exactions.140  The
Court was not willing under the rough proportionality test to con-
clude that the environmental impact of land development justified
the need for a money exaction to mitigate offsite environment
harm in the drainage district and remanded the case to the lower
court.141  The Court applied a means-ends analysis to limit the use
of an adjudicatory conditional demand by requiring closer connec-
tion between the regulation and its purpose and justification that
are set forth in policy purposes and substantive obligations of adju-
dicatory decisions.142  Furthermore, the Court buttressed the closer
connection between means and ends of conditional demands by
concluding that the right to receive just compensation is significant
enough to be protected by a higher standard of review under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.143  Thus, integrated sus-
tainability regulation that contains a strand of adjudicatory condi-
138. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (noting essential nexus must exist between land
dedication condition and its public purpose).
139. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394-95 (noting rough proportionality must exist be-
tween land dedication condition and impact of land development project on
community).
140. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (applying rough proportionality test to adjudi-
catory decisions but not clarifying whether test applies to legislative exactions).
141. Id. at 2603 (noting that Court did not apply rough proportionality test).
142. Id. at 2595 (recognizing Court concluded rough proportionality test ap-
plies to money exactions).
143. Id. at 2594-95 (finding unconstitutional condition doctrine protects fun-
damental constitutional rights by establishing higher standards of review). “Nollan
and Dolan ‘involve a special application’ of th[e] [unconstitutional conditions]
doctrine that protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for prop-
erty the government takes when owners apply for land-use permits.” Id. at 2594
(citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)) (stating unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine do not require individual to give up right to just com-
pensation to receive discretionary government benefit); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385
(invoking “the well-settled doctrine of ‘un-constitutional conditions’”).
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tional demands will not be held to a lesser standard of review, so
environmental sustainability and other planners must establish a
proportional relationship between each regulatory strand and its
purpose and justifications.
Integrated sustainability regulation will need to impose condi-
tional demands or mandates that require business and land devel-
opers to internalize the operational and other costs of doing
business. Nollan, Dolan and Koontz recognize that government uses
adjudicated and legislative monetary exactions and fees in lieu of
dedications to demand developers internalize onsite and offsite
costs of constructing and managing business and land development
projects.144  Yet, Koontz, Dolan and Nollan were not explicitly applied
by the Court to legislated money exactions and other conditional
demands.145  Nevertheless, Koontz could be easily extended to cover
legislated demands that disproportionately imposed burdens on
land developers and owners to further unjustified public ends and
that diminished the value of development projects.146  When condi-
144. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (finding Court recognizes use of land dedica-
tion conditions and money exactions to force real estate and other developers to
internalize the cost of development rather than pass this cost onto public).
In Koontz, the Court recognized but did not apply a per se test to examine
burdensome financial and other obligations and therefore, chose not to catego-
rized money exactions as per se takings. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.  However,
Koontz may apply to a class of legislated monetary exactions that would create an
extremely burdensome financial obligation and thinly justifying a public need to
avoid the payment of just compensation. See id.  If so, this application of Nollan,
Dolan and Koontz would limit regulatory efforts to force land developers and own-
ers to internalize the cost of harm or harmful impact of business and land develop-
ment on the community and its human, natural and environmental resources. See
id. at 2595. The Court found that:
Because of that direct link [between the government’s demand and a
specific parcel of real property], this case implicates the central concern
of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the government may use its substantial
power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental
ends . . . thereby diminishing without justification the value of the
property.
Id. at 2600.  If the government goes beyond reducing the value and “commands
the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such
as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is the
proper mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.” Id. at 2600 (citing Brown v.
Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)).
145. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (holding the decision in Koontz only applies to
Nollan and Dolan that involved only adjudicatory decisions); see also Koontz, 133 S.
Ct. at 2608 (Keagan, J., dissenting) (noting much uncertainty exists regarding ap-
plication of Koontz to legislative determinations).
146. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (recognizing “the risk that the government may
use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue govern-
mental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects
of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing with-
out justification the value of the property.”).
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tional demands are legitimately used to acquire money or land,
American business and land developers can be forced to internalize
the impact of business and land development projects on the com-
munity and its social, natural, and environmental resources.147
Both adjudicated and legislated conditional demands can be a reg-
ulatory strand of an integrated development and environmental
sustainability regulation to force land and business developers and
owners to internalize unwanted or unforeseen development costs
rather than passing these costs onto the community or public.148  In
the absence of deference, integrated sustainability policy and regu-
lation will be most successful if it includes public goals and objec-
tives and specific public needs based on the fiscal, social, economic,
and environmental analyses of the impact of land, retail, commer-
cial, industrial, or other development on the environment, commu-
nity, social, and other resources.
B. Land Use Management of Urban and Rural Land
Integrated sustainability regulation raises the question of
whether the Court will limit land and other property development
to protect historic and cultural assets that could be threatened by
climate change, business development, and natural and manmade
activities.  To do so, integrated sustainability regulation will need
regulatory strands, such as historic preservation regulation, and pol-
lution controls to protect natural, cultural, historical, and heritage
sites from harmful natural and manmade effects, such as business
and land development or climate change or combinations thereof.
In Penn Central Transp. Co., the Court decided whether the City of
New York’s (City) historic preservation regulation was too burden-
some on the landowner by restricting the development of private
property to preserve a historic site.149  Specifically, the Court de-
cided whether the historic preservation regulation that restricted
the development of air space over the Penn Central Station
amounted to a taking of private property for public use by City’s
147. Id. at 2595 (recognizing land dedication conditions and money exac-
tions have legitimate purpose in land use management schemes).
148. Id. (concluding money exactions, land dedication conditions, and other
exactions can be essential regulatory strand to design and implement development
and environmental sustainability policy).  The Court stated that “[o]ur precedents
thus enable permitting authorities to insist that applicants bear the full costs of
their proposals while still forbidding the government from engaging in ‘out-and-
out . . . extortion’ that would thwart the Fifth Amendment right to just compensa-
tion.” Id.
149. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978)
(stating general takings issue Court must decide).
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historic preservation regulation.150  In deciding this issue, the
Court formulated and applied the three-factor Penn Central inquiry
to examine the interference with private property rights by, the eco-
nomic impact of, and denial of reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations by the City’s historic preservation regulation on private
property to further government needs to preserve cultural assets.151
The Court concluded that historic preservation regulation did not
impose too much of a regulatory, economic or financial investment
burden on landowners that would require the City to pay them just
compensation.152  The Court held that the City’s historic preserva-
tion regulation did not amount to a regulatory taking of private
property for public use by the City153 and permitted the City to use
transferable development rights (TDRs) as an offsetting benefit to
the restrictions.154  The Penn Central inquiry is an ad hoc, objective
takings principle that would permit integrated development and
environmental sustainability regulation to consider future genera-
tions in that Penn Central Transp. Co. dealt with a historic preserva-
tion regulation that by its very nature, preserved cultural value for
future generations.
The Court has shown a willingness to allow state and local gov-
ernments to extend the exercise of police power to protect the so-
cial welfare that is threatened by the impact of business and land
development projects on community resources, services, and facili-
ties.  Government will need integrated sustainability regulation that
will include regulatory strands currently used to protect the public
150. Id. (stating specific takings issue based upon facts and law). The inter-
section of property rights, police power and Takings Clause will continue to greatly
impact land use management across rural and urban America and its response to
development and environmental sustainability policy and regulation. See Robert F.
Pecorella, Property Rights, State Police Powers, and the Takings Clause: The Evolution
Toward Dysfunctional Land-Use Management, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 59, 61-64 (2017)
(explaining that “the underlying values and the political processes which define
land-use management in the United States act as major impediments to any form
of sustainable land-use development,” and that private property rights and govern-
ment decisions “push the land-use management system to emphasize individual
market values, rather than the social implications of market transactions.”).
151. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (applying Penn Central in-
quiry to preserve historic or cultural assets).
152. Id. at 138 (concluding historic preservation regulation does not interfere
with investment-backed expectations of landowner).
153. Id. (concluding historic preservation regulation is not takings). The
Court has recognized the use of transferable development rights (TDRs) in a regu-
latory scheme to adjust the benefits and burdens of land development in rural area
with a limited market. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S.
725, 741 (1997).
154. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131 (concluding TDRs can be
granted to mitigate economic impact of historic preservation regulation).
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welfare from the harmful effects of the development on natural re-
sources.155  In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Debendictis (Key-
stone),156 the Court reviewed a regulatory takings claim challenging
the constitutionality of  Pennsylvania’s Bituminous Mine Subsi-
dence and Land Conservation Act157 (Subsidence Act) that serves
similar objectives to the Kohler Act that was held by the Court to be
a takings of private property for public use by regulation in
Mahon.158  Although this takings claim was a facial takings claim
and not an applied takings,159 the Court concluded that the Subsi-
dence Act was not a regulatory takings because the new legislation
protected the public welfare and did not interfere with taking prof-
155. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (con-
cluding that need classify land uses to protect public welfare justified modern zon-
ing mandates). The Village of Euclid is not a regulatory takings decision. Village of
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.  This case illustrates that modern cities were facing sus-
tainability policy concerns that were an entirely different need to change to pro-
tect the public welfare. Id. at 392.  The Court described how modern cities
responded to the impact of technology, business development and growth on
neighborhoods and facilities by enacting a comprehensive land use regulatory
scheme. See id. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 93-95 (1925)).
In the Village of Euclid, the Court quoted language of the Supreme Court of Illinois
that aptly described a past challenge causing state and local governments to extend
the exercise of police power to address concurrent changes in technology, busi-
ness growth, industry and population by enacting comprehensive zoning regula-
tions. See id. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 93-95 (1925)).
The Court stated that:
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in City of Aurora v. Burns . . . in sustaining
a comprehensive building zone ordinance dividing the city into eight dis-
tricts, including exclusive residential districts for one and two-family
dwellings, churches, educational institutions and schools, said:
The constantly increasing density of our urban populations, the mul-
tiplying forms of industry, and the growing complexity of our civiliza-
tion make it necessary for the State, either directly or through some
public agency by its sanction, to limit individual activities to a greater
extent than formerly. With the growth and development of the state
the police power necessarily develops, within reasonable bounds, to
meet the changing conditions.
Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora, 319 Ill. at 93-95).  Today, a
much greater challenge that is caused by the harmful impact of business and land
development on land use management, natural resources and environmental qual-
ity and the detrimental interaction of this development with population, social
welfare and culture demand an integrated sustainability policy and regulation. See
Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, ¶47 (recognizing development and en-
vironmental sustainability includes economic, social and environmental interests).
156. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Debendictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
157. 52 P.S. §§ 1406.1 et seq. (2017).
158. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 481-85 (reviewing relevant facts
and their similarity to Mahon).
159. Id. at 495-96 (recognizing that petitioners filed facial takings challenge,
Court stated that “petitioners have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it
commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal
interests in western Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners have not even pointed to a
single mine that can no longer be mined for profit.”).
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its from the mines.160  The Court concluded that the Subsidence
Act was designed to protect the public welfare whereas the Kohler
Act was designed to protect the houses of private landowners who
had taken risk by purchasing only surface rights under a con-
tract.161  Integrated sustainability regulation must be mindful of
well-established contractual bargains but must willingly obligate or
forcefully urge business and land developers to avoid harmful prac-
tices creating new or expanding old public needs.  Environmental,
natural resource, and land use planners must understand the eco-
nomics of integrated development and environmental sustainability
regulation to know when well-established legal relationships should
be challenged as detrimental by making new policy and regulation
to save the planet.
C. Preservation and Conservation of Natural Resources
Integrated sustainability regulation will include a regulatory
strand that severely limits use or bans all use of the land to protect
the public from the harmful effects of land development, business
expansion, and construction projects.  The Court has not permitted
land use or environment regulation, such as coastal zone manage-
ment,162 to deny all beneficial use of the land, though the land-
owner was still permitted to use the property for leisure or
recreation.163  In Lucas, the Court established a per se test to deny
deference to a coastal zone management regulation and gave more
protection to common law land uses by not permitting the state
legislature to totally deny land development (or uses) permitted at
common law.164 Lucas uses common law background doctrine to
160. See id. at 506 (stating Court’s conclusion that gave deference to state
need to protect public welfare).
161. See id. (contrasting purposes of legislative acts in Mahon and Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass’n).
162. For an explanation of coastal zone management regulation to further
sustainability, see Sam Kalen, The Coastal Zone Management Act of Today: Does Sus-
tainability Have a Chance?, 15 SE. L.J. 191, 196 (2006) (discussing use of public trust
doctrine to make coastal zone management act further sustainability).
163. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1027 (recognizing
denial of economical viable use does not deny noneconomical uses, such as recrea-
tion). The Court stated that “[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on peti-
tioner’s land; they rarely support prohibition of the ‘essential use’ of land . . . .”
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
164. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31 (denying government power to prohibit all
economical uses that existed at common law).  The Court established a narrow
takings inquiry or analysis by limiting it to nuisance law that existed at common
law. Id.  The Court stated that:
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firmly justify the per se test.165 Lucas established a per se test to
protect the right to receive just compensation when the govern-
ment takes all economic use of private property, notwithstanding
any recreational and other beneficial uses.166 Lucas established a
per se test for a category of government regulation that denies all
economically viable use of private property where such use had
been protected under the land title at common law.167  Integrated
sustainability regulation that includes regulatory strands prohibit-
ing or banning total economic or development uses needs to in-
clude sufficient economic incentives, benefits and subsidies, pay
just compensation or permit some economically beneficial use of a
portion of the tract of land if this land is suitable for business or
land development.
Lucas’ per se test for a denial of all economically viable use may
not prohibit a regulatory strand of integrated sustainability regula-
tion prohibiting or banning use of land or business development.
The economic or beneficial use of a portion of a tract of land regu-
lated by highly restrictive land use or environmental regulation that
prohibits some but not all uses may remove the whole of the tract
from coverage under the strict Lucas per se test and subject this
tract to the more deferential Penn Central inquiry.  In Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island (Palazzolo),168 the Court reviewed three issues that in-
cluded a ripeness issue that required the owner to submit a plan of
lesser land development, a post-dated acquisition of a tract of land
already subject to land use or environmental regulation, and a tak-
ings issue regarding a denial of all economically viable use of this
tract by requiring the owner to make a smaller development.169
First of all, the Court addressed the ripeness issue and decided that
When, however, a regulation that declares “off-limits” all economically
productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant back-
ground principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.
The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as
the application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among
other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adja-
cent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 826, 827, 827(e),
828(a), (b), and (c), 830 and 831 (Am. Law Inst. 1979)).
165. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (creating common law doctrine to protect
right to develop land).
166. Id. at 1030-31 (establishing category of takings that deny all economically
viable use).
167. Id. (establishing a category of per se takings based on the use of land
under the title at common law).
168. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2002).
169. Id. at 616 (listing three issues addressed by Supreme Court of Rhode
Island).
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the takings claim was ripe for review by the state trial court in that
the petitioner had complied with all processes and exhaustion of
remedies.170  The Court addressed the post-acquisition issue as to
whether the grantee who acquired the tract of land after the wet-
land regulations were imposed could file a regulatory takings claim
under Lucas and concluded that the petitioner could.171  Simply,
common law background principles under the title did not termi-
nate future takings claims under environment regulation that had
been enacted before the acquisition.172  Finally, the Court held that
the wetland regulations did not violate the Takings Clause by deny-
ing all economically viable use to the petitioner if these regulations
permitted the owners to construct one or more houses on the 18
acre tract of land.173  Furthermore, the Court remanded the case to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court and instructed it to apply the
Penn Central inquiry.174  Therefore, Palazzolo can limit Lucas to inte-
grated development and environmental sustainability regulation
that does not permit business and land developers to use any por-
tion of the tract subject to burdensome land use or environmental
restrictions that would not have existed on the title at common law.
V. TAKINGS, PUBLIC USE, AND JUST COMPENSATION
CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”175  This consti-
tutional statement is referred to as the Takings Clause, Just Com-
170. Id. at 625-26.  The Court stated that its ripeness doctrine permits federal,
state, county and municipal agencies to exercise discretion, such as variances, in
imposing land use regulation. See id.  The Court stated that:
Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation
which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the
landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow
regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering devel-
opment plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any
variances or waivers allowed by law.
Id. at 620-21.
171. Id. at 629-30 (identifying other issues Court had to address to reach tak-
ings issue).
172. Id. (refusing to apply background principles of Lucas to takings issue in
Palazzolo).  The Court stated that “[i]t suffices to say that a regulation that other-
wise would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a
background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.” Id.
173. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
174. Id. (refusing to apply per se test of Lucas and remanding for lower court
to apply Penn Central inquiry).
175. U.S. CONST., AMEND. V (stating limitations on exercises of eminent do-
main, police, and other government powers taking private property for public
use).
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pensation Clause, or Public Use Clause, depending on the
constitutional challenge to a government regulation or condemna-
tion of private property.176  Each Clause grants the landowners a
unique right to assert a constitutional challenge to protect his or
her private property rights of personal and real property.177  Fore-
most, the Takings Clause governs exercises of eminent domain
power to take or condemn property and exercises of regulatory
powers to severely limit or interfere with the use of private prop-
erty.178  Next, the Public Use Clause governs the use and purpose of
private property taken by the government to provide services and
other benefits to the public.179  Finally, the Just Compensation
Clause governs the payment of compensation or public funds by
the government to the landowner for a taking of private property
by eminent domain and regulation.180  Thus, business and land de-
velopers and owners can raise constitutional claims under these
Clauses to address interferences with exercises of private property
rights by making and implementing integrated development and
environmental sustainability policy and regulation.
A. Takings Clause as a Limitation on Integrated Sustainability
Government regulation or decisions challenged as takings
must further legitimate public objectives.  The taking theory that is
applied to government regulation and decisions will determine the
weight courts must give to these objectives in the takings analysis.181
A physical takings is a per se analysis or categorical rule that deter-
176. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (setting forth Takings
Clause to protect private property from burdensome regulation); Kelo v. New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-81 (2005) (setting forth Public Use Clause to protect
private property from exercise of eminent domain power); see Horne v. United
States Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431-32 (2015) (setting forth
Just Compensation Clause to protect landowner from taking of private property
without payment of  just compensation).
177. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (raising takings claims
under Takings Clause); Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-81 (2005) (raising
public use claim under Public Use Clause); Horne v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431-32 (2015) (addressing just compensation argu-
ment raised under Just Compensation Clause).
178. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (explaining purpose and
use of Takings Clause).
179. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-81 (explaining purpose and use of Takings
Clause).
180. See Horne v. United States Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419,
2431-32 (2015) (explaining principles applied to determine payment of just
compensation).
181. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (confirming public interest is given no weight in the determination of phys-
ical occupation).
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mines whether a government regulation allowed a person to physi-
cally occupy land and government’s only course of action is to pay
just compensation.182  In Loretto, the Court concluded that a state
statute permitting cable television companies to install antennas on
rooftops of private buildings was a physical occupation that
amounted to a physical takings of private property for public use.183
The Court also concluded that public interests were not to be con-
sidered in the takings analysis for the physical takings theory.184
Thus, the application of  a physical takings analysis to review regula-
tory strands of development and environmental sustainability regu-
lation gives no weight to development and environmental
sustainability objectives and needs.
Other government actions have resulted in classifying and find-
ing a takings that gave greater protection to private property rights
under regulatory takings theory.  Regulatory takings giving greater
protection to property rights requires a closer connection between
means and ends of adjudicatory conditional demands.  In Dolan
and Nollan, the Court sought to limit the use of land dedication
conditions, and in Koontz, the Court sought to limit the use of adju-
dicated money exactions and fees in lieu of land dedications.185
Simply, the petitioner, Koontz, was asked to pay a mitigation fee to
reduce the offsite impact of development rather than grant govern-
ment a right to use the land.186 Nollan, Dolan and Koontz were the
Court’s application of constitutional doctrine to justify a closer con-
nection between the means and ends of regulation by analyzing the
purpose of and need for impact exactions by the community.187  If
the government had taken an easement by regulation in Dolan, “it
182. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27
(1982) (stating physical takings theory applied to determine if occupation of pri-
vate property by government amounts to physical takings).
In Loretto, the Court noted two precedents to explain its application of physi-
cal takings theory rather than a physical invasion. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. 166 (1871) (concluding that dam permanently flooding plaintiff’s land was
physical takings of private property); Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99
U.S. 635 (1879) (distinguishing regulatory takings from physical takings when land
is flooded).
183. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (holding government had caused physical takings
by mandating installation of antenna on petitioner’s rooftop).
184. Id. at 426 (confirming public interest of government regulation or deci-
sion was not factor in Court’s determination of physical takings).
185. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2599 (2013) (identifying purposes of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz in deciding consti-
tutionality of impact exactions).
186. Id. at 2593 (stating relevant facts).
187. Id. at 2595-97 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
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would have committed a per se taking.”188  A regulatory strand that
consist of adjudicatory conditional demands to implement inte-
grated sustainability regulation must comply with essential nexus
and rough proportionality when federal, state, and local policy-
makers make adjudicatory land use and other decisions to further
public objectives and needs by imposing conditional demands on a
specific land or business development project.
Integrated development and environmental sustainability pol-
icy and regulation must be mindful of the severe limitations im-
posed by the per se test or categorical duty on the exercise of
government powers severely interfering or totally denying the exer-
cises of private property rights. Lucas established a per se test for a
category of government regulation that was a  denial of all econom-
ically viable use of private property to further coastal zone manage-
ment objectives.189  The Court gave no deference to government
and relied on common law background principles to prohibit a
state legislature from using a highly restrictive legislative scheme or
ban on land development to protect coastal land.190  However, Lu-
cas is a narrow precedent that requires development and environ-
mental planners and other managers to leave some beneficial
development of a tract of land that must be regulated by a regula-
tory strand severely restricting or totally prohibiting land use under
integrated development and environmental sustainability regula-
tion.191  The Court’s expansion or use of more common law and
constitutional doctrines to establish more per se tests and height-
ened scrutiny standards of review may not be a narrow precedent of
Lucas or narrow regulatory strand of Dolan.  In the foreseeable fu-
ture, Dolan and Lucas should not severely limit the use of integrated
development and environmental sustainability regulation by totally
denying the use of one or more regulatory strands to impose more
reasonable regulatory restrictions and conditional demands on bus-
iness and land development projects.
188. Id. at 2598-99 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372, 384 (1994)
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)) (“For that
reason, we began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the
government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain through the per-
mitting process, it would have committed a per se taking.”).
189. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31 (applying per se takings to category of regula-
tion that denies all economically viable use).
190. See id. (finding the Court used common law background principles to
limit deference to state legislature imposing ban on development).
191. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2002) (holding that
per se test of Lucas did not apply when landowner could build on portion of tract).
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B. Public Use or Purpose as a Limitation on Integrated
Sustainability
Federal, state, and local governments may need to take or con-
demn land by an exercise of eminent domain to further develop-
ment and environmental sustainability policy goals and objectives.
This taking or condemnation raises the question whether the Pub-
lic Use Clause permits an exercise of eminent domain power to
take developable land solely to prevent land and business develop-
ment from causing extreme ecological harm or social degradation
mostly to future generations.  The Court has given public use a
broad interpretation that includes the exercise of eminent domain
power by government to further public objectives.192  In Berman v.
Parker (Berman),193 the Court permitted the federal government to
exercise eminent domain power to condemn and replace blighted
areas with private commercial redevelopment.194 The Court al-
lowed a government agency to take title to this area that could also
be transferred to a private enterprise for redevelopment as a public
use.195  In Berman, the Court did not address the question of
whether government could take or condemn private property that
was not in a blighted area solely to further economic development
objectives.196  The Court waited almost a half century to decide
whether it would permit a takings solely for economic development
as the public use.
The exercise of eminent domain power to further economic
development policy is just the opposite of using it to prevent land
and business development.  Sustainable development and environ-
ment may require government to condemn land or its development
solely to prevent ecological harm or economic distress to the com-
munity and its natural, economic or human resources.  In Kelo v.
New London (Kelo),197 the Court was given an opportunity to address
the issue of a takings for public use by eminent domain solely for
economic development.198  In Kelo, New London created a redevel-
192. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (giving broad interpretation
to public use).
193. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
194. Id. at 33 (concluding Court permitted exercise of eminent domain
power to demolish blighted area).
195. Id. (concluding Court permitted government to transfer blighted land
that had been taken by eminent domain to private developer).
196. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (finding Court did not
address in Berman exercise of eminent domain power to condemn non-blighted
property for transfer to private developer).
197. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
198. Id. at 484 (setting issue addressed by Court).
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opment “plan that . . . was ‘projected to create in excess of 1,000
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an eco-
nomically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront ar-
eas.’”199  New London acquired the land to implement its plan by
“purchas[ing] property from willing sellers and propos[ing] to use
the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the
property from unwilling owners in exchange for just compensa-
tion.”200  The Court concluded that whether New London had a
requisite public use “turn[ed] on the question whether the City’s
development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”201  The Court noted
that it had a “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judg-
ments in this field”202 and stated that “[f]or more than a century,
our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas
and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad lati-
tude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”203  Thus, the Court’s deference to federal and state policy-
makers under the Public Use Clause may broadly permit the inte-
grated development and environmental sustainability policy and
regulation to include eminent domain.  This inclusion would per-
mit the taking or condemning to further ecological and economic
objectives to protect land, natural resources and environmental
quality for future generations.
C. Just Compensation as a Limitation on Integrated
Sustainability
The government may need to offer offsetting benefits and in-
centives as regulatory strands to implement integrated development
and environmental sustainability policy and regulation to adjust the
disproportionate burdens of other regulatory strands denying the
199. Id. at 472 (reviewing relevant facts).
200. Id. (reviewing relevant facts).
201. Id. at 480 (reviewing relevant facts).
202. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (noting that “[i]n Berman v. Parker . . . this Court
upheld a redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area of Washington, D.C., in
which most of the housing for the area’s 5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair.”).
203. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (finding that Court has deferred to judgment of
government on exercises of eminent domain power).  Prior to Kelo, a few states
had given narrow interpretations to public use and held that the exercise of emi-
nent domain power for economic development was not a valid public use. See, e.g.,
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004) (concluding
exercise of eminent domain power to condemn property for economic develop-
ment project, namely industrial park, violated state constitution); Southwestern Ill.
Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 2002) (concluding exercise of
eminent domain power for economic purpose and transfer of property to third
party violated state constitution).
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right to receive just compensation.  The Court has yet to decide
whether the mitigation of a regulatory takings by giving a valuable
benefit means to reduce the amount of just compensation or re-
duce taking liability under the Takings Clause.  In Penn Central, the
Court chose not to decide “whether the transferable development
rights afforded appellants constitute ‘just compensation’ within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”204  The Court chose to decide
the taking issue and not address the role of TDRs in deciding regu-
latory taking liability or valuing just compensation.205  The Court
concluded that “[w]hile [transferable development] rights may well
not have constituted ‘just compensation’ if a ‘taking’ had occurred,
the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial
burdens the law has imposed on appellants . . . .”206  Although the
Court would consider the value of TDRs and other benefits in ad-
dressing the impact of land use and other regulation, the Court
leaves much undecided about the value and role of TDRs and other
benefits in takings jurisprudence.
Almost two decades later, the value of TDRs arose as an issue in
another decision that was addressing a regulatory takings.  The
value and role of TDRs still remain an open question in determin-
ing liability or just compensation under the takings equation.  In
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (Suitum),207 the Court rec-
ognized the use of TDRs in a regulatory scheme to restrict land
development in some areas around Lake Tahoe where a limited
market existed for the sale of TDRs.208  The dissent in Suitum would
not agree that TDRs could be used to mitigate takings liability but
favored the use of TDRs to mitigate just compensation once the
Court concluded that a government regulation amounted to a reg-
ulatory takings with payment of just compensation.209 Suitum and
Penn Central did not decide the role TDRs, government benefits
and value added by regulation itself would play in the takings equa-
tion that permits offsetting benefits and value to fit on either liabil-
204. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978)
(footnote omitted) (finding Court chose not to decide whether transferable devel-
opment rights (TDRs) always mitigate just compensation and had no need to ad-
dress taking liability that was not found in Penn Central Transp. Co.).
205. See id. at 137 (refusing to decide whether TDRs mitigate liability and just
compensation).
206. Id. at 137 (concluding TDRs can be applied to reduce financial burdens
of just compensation) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 n.3
(1962)).
207. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
208. Id. at 741 (stating relevant facts).
209. Id. at 747-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that TDRs mitigate just
compensation and not liability).
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ity or compensation side of the takings equation.  Notwithstanding
the uncertainty surrounding the role of offsetting benefits and
value in the takings equation, an integrated development and envi-
ronmental sustainability policy should include regulatory strands of
benefits, subsidies, and incentives. Further the policy should be
placed in the takings equation based upon intent of, need for, na-
ture of, outcome with, and impact of the benefit on aiding land
developers and owners to avoid or minimize the economic weight
of bearing the public burdens, though government should not be
allowed to avoid takings liability for unjustifiable needs for overly
restrictive regulatory strands of integrated sustainability regulation.
These factors favor mitigating just compensation and not allowing
government to avoid takings liability under multiple strands of inte-
grated sustainability policy and regulation.
The Court must eventually decide how government benefits,
incentives, or other offsetting value affect the takings equation.  A
regulatory strand of an integrated sustainability regulation that pro-
vides subsidies and other benefits to land and business developers
may still amount to physical takings.  In Horne v. United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (Horne II),210 raisin growers and handlers filed a
takings claim as a defense to avoid paying government fines and
other fees that had been imposed for a violation of agricultural
marketing regulations.211  The Court concluded that the United
States Department of Agriculture (Department) had committed a
physical takings and had to pay just compensation.212  The Court
relied on the traditional rule that has been applied to determine
just compensation for takings of private property for public use.213
The Court would not permit government to mitigate takings liabil-
ity or offset just compensation by providing benefits and services
that had a measurable economic value.214  The Department sought
to mitigate compensation that could eventually eliminate any finan-
cial recovery for physical takings liability.215  The Department ar-
210. Horne v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
211. Id. at 2425 (stating relevant facts).
212. Id. at 2431 (finding Court concluded regulations of United States De-
partment of Agriculture (Department) amounted to physical takings of peti-
tioner’s raisins).
213. Id. at 2432 (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29
(1984)) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)) (“Instead, our
cases have set forth a clear and administrable rule for just compensation: ‘The
Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by
‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’’”).
214. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2432.
215. Id. (finding Department sought to eliminate just compensation when it
was liable for physical takings).
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gued to make just compensation dependent on non-monetary
benefits and services provided by the government to program par-
ticipants.216  The Court rejected the Department’s approach to de-
termining the amount of just compensation and referred to this
approach as merely hypothetical.217  The Court must eventually de-
cide when government can use offsetting benefits to reduce the
amount of just compensation.  Although the Court accepted a phys-
ical takings as a defense, it rejected offsetting benefits and value
added revenues as just compensation that would not be similar to a
common law remedy awarded for an injury inflicted by a govern-
ment wrong, namely a physical takings.218  The Department argued
that the Court should offset just compensation with the program
and market benefits bestowed by the agricultural subsidy program,
such as value added by participating in the price support program
and increased market demand by consumer due to quality of the
raisins.219  The Department also argued that the Hornes were also
not due just compensation because the program and market bene-
fits would exceed the value of raisins taken, thus giving them a net
gain.220  The Court did not find the Department’s argument per-
suasive because it lacked support and was merely a hypothetical-
based approach to determine just compensation for a specific physi-
cal takings.221  The Court chose not to decide the question of the
role of government benefits and must eventually decide the role of
offsetting benefits in the taking equation.222  Therefore, regulatory
uncertainty still exists regarding regulatory strands of an integrated
sustainability regulation granting offering benefits and incentives
and contributing to an increase in value of private property until
the Court decides whether these benefits and value of regulatory
strands mitigates takings liability or just compensation.
216. Id. (finding the Court would not allow the Department to completely
offset just compensation owed).
217. Id. (choosing not to recognize respondent’s argument on using setting
benefits as just compensation).
218. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2432 (finding respondent’s argument on just com-
pensation unpersuasive).
219. Id. (reviewing relevant facts).
220. Id. (finding Department argued market benefits and services eliminated
recovery of just compensation).
221. Id. (rejecting Department’s argument to use market services and benefits
to totally offset just compensation though finding physical takings).
222. Id. (concluding Court refused again to decide where incentives and off-
setting benefits and services fit in takings equation).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The burdens of implementing sustainable development and
environment will not be accepted by government and imposed on
business, land developers and landowners until the federal, state, or
local government enacts integrated development and environment
sustainability policy and legislation to provide development and en-
vironmental benefits for current and future generations.  Tradi-
tional land use, natural resources, environment quality, social
welfare, and other regulatory schemes form regulatory strands that
have imposed well-established burdens and obligations on landown-
ers.  However, emerging and future regulatory schemes to address
the causes and harmful effects of climate change, energy develop-
ment, social degradation, and other sustainability policy needs will
form new regulatory strands.  Both traditional and new strands cre-
ate codependent and interdependent obligations of integrated sus-
tainability policy and regulation to regulate business and land
development and other industrial and commercial activities.  These
future regulatory strands and their interdependent and codepen-
dent obligations increase the public burdens to be borne by govern-
ments.  The public burdens or obligations cannot be transferred or
borne by landowners under the Takings Clause.  When the public
burdens fall principally on business and land developers and own-
ers, a takings question will arise under integrated sustainability reg-
ulation regarding whether land and business owners and
developers are bearing too much of the public burdens that should
be borne by government by paying just compensation for taking of
private property for public use under the Takings Clause.  Thus,
the public burdens cannot be disproportionately borne by land and
business developers and owners where government is not willing to
pay just compensation for overly burdensome regulation of devel-
opment and environment denying exercises of private property
rights to develop business and land.
The Court must decide whether codependent and interdepen-
dent regulatory strands of integrated sustainability regulation effect
physical or regulatory takings of private property for public use
under the Takings Clause.  These strands allow government to
avoid paying just compensation when government obligates land
and business developers and owners to bear the public burdens to
implement sustainable development and environment.  Integrated
development and sustainability regulation must comply with mostly
objective takings standards and principles and a few bright line
principles of the Takings Clause to avoid a physical or regulatory
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takings of private property by interfering with the use or exercise of
private property rights.  First, integrated sustainability regulation
must have a legitimate government purpose and possess a sufficient
connection to community needs under either deferential, interme-
diate, or strict scrutiny standard of review by courts.  Second, inte-
grated sustainability regulation must not occupy private property
where such an occupation may affect a physical takings requiring a
categorical duty to pay just compensation and must also avoid a per
se takings by denying all beneficial use of a tract of land when any
part of the tract of land is suitable for development.  Third, inte-
grated sustainability regulation is subject to the Penn Central inquiry
to determine whether it amounts to a regulatory takings by interfer-
ing with an exercise of private property rights, causing too great an
economic impact or denying investment-back expectations of the
owner.  Of course, the Court may avoid current takings law by fash-
ioning an entirely new or extending a categorical duty or per se
test.  Alternatively, the Court may attempt again to advance judicial
takings theory if integrated sustainability regulation requires fed-
eral or state courts to substantially deviate from established com-
mon law.  Thus, environmental and land use planners and lawyers
must be mindful and guard strongly against demanding or mandat-
ing that land and business developers and owners bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the public burdens that should always be
government’s burden under most circumstances.
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